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Multilateralism in Space:
Opportunities and Challenges for Achieving Space Security
Theresa Hitchens
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

Human activity in space has, from the dawn of
the space age, been characterized by a “push
me, pull you” dynamic between competition
and cooperation. There is no doubt it was the
Cold War rivalry between the United States
and the then Soviet Union that drove initial
efforts to breech the space frontier, and that
military competition has long been, and
continues to be, a central factor in states’
pursuit of space capabilities. At the same time,
even during the height of tensions between the
two superpowers, international cooperation in
the space exploration and sciences was
considered a high priority. Not only did the
United States and the Soviet Union seek to
cooperate with each other regarding human
space flight, but they also reached out to other
less-developed space players.

international legal instruments and multilateral
institutions that govern space activities –
many of which sprang from the Cold War era
and the efforts by the United States and Soviet
Union to put boundaries around their military
space race. For example, there is more and
more competition for the limited resource of
frequency spectrum, particularly for satellites
in the coveted and ever more crowded
geosynchronous (GEO) orbital belt.2 The past
20 years have also seen an explosion in the
use of space-related technologies for tactical
military applications, such as weapons
targeting and real-time imaging, creating
potential geopolitical instability among major
space players as each seeks to reduce its own
vulnerabilities in space and exploit those of
potential adversaries.

This fragile balance between competitive
pressures and cooperative benefits has helped
to create the foundation for the rapid
expansion of global space activities over the
last 50 years that has greatly benefitted
economic and social development around the
world. There are now some 1,100 active
spacecraft on orbit and more than 60 states
and/or commercial entities owning and/or
operating satellites. 1

Finally, the February 2009 collision between a
working Iridium communications satellite and
a defunct Russian Cosmos military satellite –
the first-ever collision of two intact satellites
that created a very large debris field – spurred
concern among satellite owners, operators,
and governments about the challenge of
tracking, avoiding, mitigating, and removing
uncontrolled space debris that threatens
satellite operations. 3 For all three of these

However, the ever increasing usage of space
by more and more actors is inevitably leading
to pressures on the rather weak body of
1

James N. Miller, Testimony to the House Armed Services
Committee Strategic Forces subcommittee, 16 March 2010,
http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/StratForces031610/
Miller_Testimony031610.pdf (accessed March 2010).

2
GEO is located at 36,000 km in altitude, where satellites
essentially remain over the same spot on Earth allowing
continuous broadcasting to fixed receiver sites.
3
See “Iridium 33 – Cosmos 2551 Collision” at
http://www.agi.com/media-center/multimedia/current-events/
iridium-33-cosmos-2251-collision/default.aspx; and also see
Orbital Debris Quarterly News, http://orbitaldebris.jsc.
nasa.gov/newsletter/newsletter.html (both accessed May
2010).
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reasons, it is becoming important for
multilateral cooperation to avoid harmful
competition, accidents, and increased potential
for conflict in space, which is legally
enshrined as a global commons. This, in turn,
increases the need for more attention to, and
more focused work by, the three major
multilateral institutions aimed at ensuring the
global commons of space remains safe,
secure, and available for the use of all: (1) the
United Nations Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS); (2) the
International
Telecommunication
Union
(ITU); and (3) the United Nations Conference
on Disarmament (CD).
This article will review the status of,
opportunities for, and challenges to these three
multilateral institutions. It will further
examine the arguable need for better crossfertilization of effort among the three, given
the interconnectivity of space activities in the
civil, commercial, and military arenas, and the
potential for competition and accidents to
contribute to a climate of tension and potential
conflict.
Foundations of Multilateralism
The Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967
provides the basic foundation for international
space law, and could be seen as the central
pillar of the current multilateral institutional
framework. 4 OST was primarily negotiated in
a bilateral back and forth between the United
States and the Soviet Union, both of which
submitted drafts to the United Nations (UN)
General Assembly in 1966, as a means of
mitigating what both sides saw as a risky
elevation of the nuclear arms race to space,
and to quell growing fears of just such a
4

For a brief history of the treaty negotiations, see Arms
Control Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/
outerspace (accessed April 2010).

nuclear space race among the international
community. 5 Most critically, the OST
establishes space as a global commons “not
subject to national appropriation by claim of
sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or
by any other means.” 6 It further prohibits the
stationing of weapons of mass destruction in
space or on celestial bodies; limits uses of the
Moon and other celestial bodies to exclusively
peaceful
purposes;
and
forbids
the
establishment of military bases, the testing of
weapons, and military maneuvers on the
Moon and other celestial bodies.
As of January 2009, 100 countries have
ratified the OST and 26 others have signed,
but not yet ratified. 7 The OST is the basis for
the four other international treaties governing
space activities, all of which were developed
and negotiated under the auspices of
COPUOS.
1. The 1968 Agreement on the Rescue of
Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and
the Return of Objects Launched into Outer
Space (Rescue Agreement), with 90
ratifications, 24 signatures and one
acceptance of rights and obligations as of
January 2009.
2. The 1972 Convention on International
Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects (Liability Convention), with 87
ratifications, 23 signatures and three

5

One should note that the negotiations took place in the
aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, which itself gave added
impetus to superpower efforts to control their nuclear
competition.
6
Treaty on Principles Governing Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and
other Celestial Bodies (hereafter, Outer Space Treaty),
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/outerspt.html
(accessed April 2010).
7
“Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its forty-eighth
session in Vienna from 23 March to 3 April 2009,”
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/reports/ac105/AC105_935
E.pdf (accessed April 2010).

Space and Defense, Summer 2010

acceptances of rights and obligations as of
January 2009.
3. The 1976 Convention on Registration of
Objects Launched into Outer Space
(Registration Convention), with 52
ratifications, four signatures, and two
acceptances of rights and obligations as of
January 2009.
4. The 1984 Agreement Governing the
Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies (Moon Agreement), with
13 ratifications and four signatures as of
January 2009.
According to the UN Office of Outer Space
Affairs (OOSA), which implements decisions
made by COPUOS and the UN General
Assembly on space issues, the legal principles
enshrined in these five treaties (OST, Rescue
Agreement, Liability Convention, Registration
Convention, and Moon Agreement) include:
…non-appropriation of outer space
by any one country, arms control, the
freedom of exploration, liability for
damage caused by space objects, the
safety and rescue of spacecraft and
astronauts, the prevention of harmful
interference with space activities and
the environment, the notification and
registration of space activities,
scientific investigation and the
exploitation of natural resources in
outer space and the settlement of
disputes. Each of the treaties lays
great stress on the notion that the
domain of outer space, the activities
carried out therein and whatever
benefits might accrue therefrom
should be devoted to enhancing the
well-being of all countries and
humankind, and each includes
elements elaborating the common
idea of promoting international
cooperation in outer space activities. 8

Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space
As noted above, the body of international
space law was negotiated under the auspices
of COPUOS, which was established in 1959
by the General Assembly to promote research,
information sharing, and international
cooperation in space; create cooperative space
programs under UN auspices; and assume
legal problems and issues surrounding the use
of space. 9 COPUOS is the only formal body
empowered to negotiate new international
space laws. There are 69 member states in
COPUOS and a large number of nongovernmental
and
intergovernmental
organizations are observers. COPUOS
activities are centered in two subcommittees –
the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee,
and the Legal Subcommittee – which meet
annually and report to the annual meeting of
the full committee. The last COPUOS
meetings were held 3-12 June 2009 and 9-18
June 2010. 10 Decisions within COPUOS are
taken via voting by member states, although
consensus is usually sought, and reported out
to the General Assembly where those
decisions are considered, and usually
endorsed.
Much of the work of COPUOS is dedicated to
information sharing, education, and capacity
building in developing countries. COPUOS
oversees, for example, the work of the UN
Program on Space Applications, implemented
by OOSA and aimed at building capacity
through international workshops, training
courses, and pilot projects on issues, such as
satellite navigation systems. The committee
9

8

http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/en/SpaceLaw/treaties.
html (accessed April 2010).

5

Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly 1472 (XIV),
International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space,
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/en/SpaceLaw/gares/html/
gares_14_1472.html (accessed April 2010).
10
The committee’s report is available at http://www.oosa.
unvienna.org/pdf/gadocs/A_64_20E.pdf (accessed April
2010).
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also oversees implementation of the
recommendations
emanating
from
UNISPACE III, a major international
conference held from 19-30 July 1999 in
Vienna, Austria with the goal of identifying
and taking actions designed “to maximize
opportunities for human development through
the use of space science and technology and
their applications.” 11 COPUOS, under the
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee,
continues to follow national, regional and
multinational
efforts
to
implement
UNISPACE III’s Plan of Action on an annual
basis.
Similarly, the Scientific and Technical
Committee follows progress reports of the UN
Platform for Space-based Information for
Disaster Management (UN-SPIDER). UNSPIDER, launched by the General Assembly
in 2006, “to provide universal access to all
countries and all relevant international and
regional organizations to all types of spacebased information and services relevant to
disaster management to support the full
disaster management cycle.” 12 UN-SPIDER
implementation is supervised by OOSA, with
input from several regional support offices
and national focal points, who work with UNSPIDER staff “to strengthen national disaster
management planning and policies, and
implement specific national activities that
incorporate space-based technology solutions
in support of disaster management.” 13

11

“Draft Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space on the implementation of the Third United
Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space (UNISPACE III),” UN General Assembly, 21
November
2003,
http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/limited/c1/
AC105_C1_L272E.pdf (accessed April 2010).
12
“Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Report on
activities carried out in 2009 in the framework of the United
Nations Platform on Space-based Information for Disaster
and Emergency Response,” UN General Assembly, 23
December 2009, paragraph 1, http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/
pdf/reports/ac105/AC105_955E.pdf (accessed April 2010).
13
Ibid, paragraph 10.

While there has been a great deal of activity in
this arena in recent years, a chronic shortage
of funding – which although subsidized by the
UN regular budget, is primarily provided by
contributions of member states – is an ongoing
constraint. It should be clear to states that such
activities are necessary for ensuring the safety
and security of space assets, as newcomers to
the arena require
not
…implementation assistance
of the voluntary only to most
efficiently benefit
guidelines for the from the use of
mitigation of space, but also to
space debris at avoid
harmful
the national level impact on others.
would increase In addition, “buyto
best
mutual in”
practices
is
understanding on required by all
acceptable spacefaring states,
activities in as the physics of
space, thus space cannot be
and
enhancing avoided,
inevitably mean
stability in
that what any one
space... actor does in
space has the
potential to affect all others, whether
positively or negatively.
COPUOS also has been relatively active, and
relatively successful if at a slow pace, in
studying emerging technical issues and
making recommendations for how states
might address these problems. The most
recent success was the development of a set of
voluntary guidelines for space debris
mitigation adopted in 2007, based on technical
recommendations developed by the InterAgency Debris Coordinating Committee
(IADC) 14 and subsequently endorsed by the
14

The IADC – comprised of the space agencies of China,
France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Russia, Ukraine and the
United States, plus the European Space Agency – was
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General Assembly in January 2008. 15 The
accord is a significant achievement for space
security, especially regarding Article 4, which
pledges nations not to deliberately create longlived debris. 16 In its most recent report, the
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee agreed
that “implementation of the voluntary
guidelines for the mitigation of space debris at
the national level would increase mutual
understanding on acceptable activities in
space, thus enhancing stability in space and
decreasing the likelihood of friction and
conflict.” 17
That said, the process took seven years and the
guidelines that resulted are less technically
specific than those recommended by the
IADC (as some states objected to measures
that would be more costly), are voluntary, lack
any elaboration of how they are to be
implemented, and contain loopholes related to
national security. All this leads to questions
about whether states will adopt them and how
strictly they will be adhered to. While there
has been some discussion in COPUOS about
further strengthening the guidelines, and
having the Legal Subcommittee consider how
they might be translated into a legally binding
mechanism, there has been no agreement to
proceed.

established in 1993 as a mechanism for space agencies to
exchange information.
15
UN General Assembly, Resolution A/Res/62/217, 10
January
2008,
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/rares/
ARES_62_217E.pdf (accessed April 2010).
16
Gerard Brachet, “Long-term Sustainability of Space
Activities,” Annex, p.131, “Security in Space: The Next
Generation – Conference Report, 31 March-1April 2008, UN
Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2008,
http://www.unidir.ch/bdd/fiche-activite.php?ref_activite=363
(accessed April 2010).
17
“Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on its
forty-sixth session, held in Vienna from 9 to 20 February
2009,” Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UN
General
Assembly,
6
March
2009,
p.13,
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/reports/ac105/AC105_933
E.pdf (accessed April 2010).
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However, continued consideration of methods
to combat space debris is likely to take place
at the Scientific and Technical Committee
through a new agenda item, “long-term
sustainability of outer space activities.” At its
18 February 2010 meeting, the subcommittee
established a new working group on the issue.
According to the agreement, the working
group should:
…examine
the
long-term
sustainability of outer space activities
in all its aspects, consistent with the
peaceful uses of outer space, and
avail itself of the progress made
within existing entities, including but
not limited to the other working
groups of the Subcommittee, the
Conference on Disarmament, the
International
Telecommunication
Union, the Inter-Agency Space
Debris Coordination Committee, the
International
Organization
for
Standardization,
the
World
Meteorological Organization and the
International Space Environment
Service. The Subcommittee agreed
that the Working Group should avoid
duplicating the work being done
within those bodies and instead
identify areas of concern for the longterm sustainability of outer space
activities that are not covered by
them. [The Subcommittee also agreed
that the Working Group should
consider organizing an exchange of
information with the commercial
space industry to understand the
views of that community.] 18

This agreement is significant for several
reasons. First, it for the first time recognizes
the need for COPUOS to liaise more closely
with the CD and the ITU on issues related to
space safety and security of the future
environment. For years, there have been set in
18
“Addendum, Draft Report of the Scientific and Technical
Subcommittee on its forty-seventh session, held in Vienna
from 8-19 February 2010,” Committee for the Peaceful Uses
of
Outer
Space,
UN
General
Assembly,
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/limited/c1/AC105_C1_L3
04Add3E.pdf (accessed April 2010).
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place rather artificial boundaries among the
three UN bodies, both for political reasons and
out of competition among the various
bureaucracies. There is now a growing
appreciation among diplomats dealing with
the space portfolio that the emerging
challenges to the safe and equitable use of
space are interlinked, and that attempting to
separate the civil, military and commercial
realms of space activities is largely futile.
Further, there is also a growing appreciation
of the need to link efforts in the political
sphere to activities of the technical community
– given the highly technical nature of space
operations. Since the 1970s, the numerous UN
bodies that are active in peacetime space
applications – ranging from ITU to the UN
Educational,
Scientific,
and
Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) – have meet
annually for the Interagency Meeting on Outer
Space Activities, with the last meeting held at
ITU headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland on
10-12 March 2010. Results of the meetings,
which are coordinated by OOSA, are reported
annually to COPUOS. 19 The goal is to ensure
that all these UN bodies are, in particular,
working to apply space technology to meet
human development goals and to minimize
duplication. Interestingly, this group does not
include the CD. The result is the effective
isolation of the political decision-makers
charged with efforts to protect space security
from potential conflict from those within the
UN system who have the most hands-on
knowledge about the need for sustained access
to space systems, and the most knowledge
about how space can be, and cannot be,
utilized and how best to ensure safe space
operations.
Second, the subcommittee agreed to charge
the working group with considering new
measures to enhance the sustainability of

space activities and a possible set of “best
practice guidelines.” 20 Based on the
discussions so far, these guidelines are likely
to fall under the rubric of “space traffic
management” – that is processes, procedures,
and new regulations for how spacecraft are
launched, operated and disposed of at the end
of their working lifetimes. While the need for
a space traffic management regime has for
many years been a topic for scientific,
industry, and academic organizations, the
issue has not been widely addressed in the
political or legal realm. It is clear that given
the increased usage of space and the growing
problems of orbital crowding and debris,
space operations – like international air travel
– will soon require more robust and accepted
rule sets to avoid
and
…the emerging accidents
challenges to the collisions, as well
safe and as dampen drivers
for conflict in the
equitable use of case of such
space are incidents.
One
interlinked, and example of the
that attempting to growing recogniseparate the civil, tion of the need
better
military and for
processes is the
commercial decision in 2010
realms of space by OOSA and the
activities is largely ITU to exchange,
futile. for the first time,
data on satellite
positions – which OOSA monitors through the
UN Registry of Space Objects and the ITU
through its Master International Frequency
Register, which registers radio frequency
transponders rather than actual satellites. A
key problem with the UN Registry is failure
by many states to actually register their
satellites, especially military or intelligence

19

See http://www.uncosa.unvienna.org/uncosa/iamos/index.
html (accessed April 2010).

20

Ibid.
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gathering satellites. 21 By contrast, almost all
states register the transponders on those
satellites with the ITU. Thus harmonization of
the two lists is a step toward a better picture of
what exactly is in space, which is in turn a
necessary foundation for ensuring both
sustainability and security in space. 22
And while COPUOS limits itself to addressing
the “peaceful uses” of space and avoids any
discussion of military space, it is obvious that
a key factor in
ensuring the long- While most
term sustainability of satellite
space for peaceful interference is
purposes will be
caused by
avoiding
military
conflict in space. technical
Indeed, if COPUOS issues or
is able to formulate a operator error,
set of “best practice there has also
guidelines” for space been an
operations,
those
increase in acts
guidelines are almost
inevitably going to of deliberate
include provisions for interference...
data sharing, which
could serve as transparency and confidencebuilding measures (TCBMs) for international
security. It is already the case that the
increased interest of the international
community in TCBMs, also confidence and
security-building measures (CSBMs), 23 has
led to considerable discussion of whether
efforts to build such a regime, whether
voluntary or legally binding, should be
undertaken in COPUOS, the CD, by both, or
by neither. What is certain is that there is
21

Jonathan McDowell, “The United Nations Registry of Space
Objects,” http://www.planet4589.org/space/un/un_desc.html
(accessed April 2010).
22
Theresa Hitchens, “Future Security in Space: Charting a
Cooperative Course,” Center for Defense Information,
Washington, DC, September 2004, pp.63-67.
23
The terms of art are slightly different and hold different
political connotations for different states.

9

growing interest in confidence-building,
witnessed by the near universal support since
2005 for a Russian-sponsored General
Assembly resolution calling on states to make
concrete proposals for new space-related
TCBMs – the United States and Israel were
the only hold-outs. Under the new
administration of President Barak Obama, the
long-standing U.S. opposition to multilateral
action has waned, and it is likely that the
United States will support some forward
motion on TCBMs, although it remains
unclear in what forum or fora.
Thus, the long-term sustainability work within
COPUOS could serve the dual purpose of
building much-needed bridges between the
key multilateral institutions (as well as with
the technical community and industry)
assigned with international space governance,
and opening an alternative pathway to longstalled efforts to address the problem of
growing military tensions in, and the potential
weaponization of, space.
In addition, at the June 2009 meeting,
COPUOS
Scientific
and
Technical
Subcommittee agreed to launch ad-hoc
working groups on a new initiative by the
current chair, Ambassador Ciro Arévelo of
Colombia: “Toward a UN Space Policy.” 24
The initiative is designed to both better
coordinate the some 25 UN bodies responsible
for some aspect of space to improve UN
governance, and to improve how the UN uses
space
applications
including
building
capabilities in emerging space states. A key
goal of the overall initiative is to raise
awareness, both within the UN and among
member states, of the value of space to
humanitarian and development goals – which
24

“Toward a UN Space Policy: An initiative of the Chairman
of the Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,”
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Fiftyseventh Session, 3 June 2009, http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/
limited/l/AC105_2009_CRP12E.pdf (accessed April 2010).
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in turn could promote cooperative behavior in
space and to dampen risk of conflict.
If the COPUOS Scientific and Technical
Subcommittee can be said to have made
reasonable, if slow, progress over recent years,
the picture is less positive in the Legal
Subcommittee. The Legal Subcommittee for
decades has continued to debate basic
questions for international space law, such as
delineating where outer space begins and how
to define a launching state, which is necessary
for assigning liability. Further, no substantial
legal accords have emanated from COPUOS
since the formation of the OST Regime in the
1960s and 1970s. Even the most recent
accomplishment of COPUOS, the Moon
Agreement, has little validity with only 13
ratifications of which there are no space
powers. 25
It is somewhat ironic that the most progress in
setting multilateral
legal accords was …willingness by
made during the China to include
Cold War period, terrestrial-based
but perhaps also
ASATs in any
understandable in
that the treaties discussions or
crafted at that time negotiations
were
essentially would in
based on bilateral essence be a
understandings
signal about
between the United
China’s “good
States and then
Soviet Union about faith” on efforts
how to protect their to prevent space
best interests in weaponization…
space. At best, the
Legal Subcommittee has served as a forum for
25
The 13 states include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile,
Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands,
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, and Uruguay. France and India,
which are space powers, have signed, but have not ratified.
Space power as used in the context here is a state that
possesses indigenous capabilities to access orbital space.

exchange of information about national
implementation of current treaties. For
example, at its most recent meeting in June
2009, the subcommittee established a new
Working Group on National Legislation
Relevant to the Peaceful Exploration and Use
of Outer Space. 26 At worst, it has done nothing
more than serve as a platform for states to
assert competing political views – the real
problems in the subcommittee are not
questions of law, but those of politics.
COPUOS has a mixed record in contributing
toward multilateral action to achieve space
security. Nevertheless, there is a recent
resurrection of interest in establishing new
forms of space governance, even if voluntary,
within COPUOS and among the member
states.
International Telecommunications
Union
The ITU is the progeny of the International
Telegraph Union, begun in 1865 to coordinate
cross-border usage of the telegraph. While
certain portions of the radio-frequency (RF)
spectrum can be shared, fundamentally there
is only so much room for users to operate –
thus, telecommunications systems based on
RF are regulated by national and international
processes designed to prevent interference.
The RF spectrum and satellite orbital slots are
considered limited natural resources that all
states have equal rights to use. Each state
manages use of the RF spectrum within its
borders, but international coordination is
required when RF signals cross borders, as is
the case for all satellites. The ITU began
coordinating space radio-communications in
1963, and is comprised of governments who
26

“Report of the Legal Subcommittee,” paragraph 10c,
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/reports/ac105/AC105_935
E.pdf (accessed April 2010).
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join as member states as well as industry
groups who join either as “sector members” or
“associates” and may participate in ITU
activities, but do not have voting rights. 27
There are 191 member states and more than
700 sector and associate members. 28 The legal
framework for the ITU was established in
1992 with the signing of the Constitution of
the International Telecommunication Union,
which entered into force in 1994 as a legally
binding treaty based on the major principles of
efficient use of and equitable access to the
spectrum and orbits. Among other things, the
constitution empowers the ITU to:
a) effect allocation of bands of the
radio-frequency
spectrum,
the
allotment of radio frequencies and the
registration
of
radio-frequency
assignments and, for space services,
of any associated orbital position in
the geostationary-satellite orbit or of
any associated characteristics of
satellites in other orbits, in order to
avoid harmful interference between
radio stations of different countries;
b) coordinate efforts to eliminate
harmful interference between radio
stations of different countries and to
improve the use made of the radiofrequency spectrum for radiocommunication services and of the
geostationary-satellite and other
satellite orbits;
c) facilitate the worldwide standardization of telecommunications, with a
satisfactory quality of service;
d) foster international cooperation
and solidarity in the delivery of
technical assistance to the developing
countries
and
the
creation,
development and improvement of
telecommunication equipment and
networks in developing countries by
every means at its disposal, including
through its participation in the
relevant programmes of the United

27

ITU, see http://www.itu.int/net/about/membership.aspx
(accessed April 2010).
28
Ibid.
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Nations and the use of its own
resources, as appropriate... 29

Member states of the ITU are bound to abide
by the provisions of the Constitution of the
International Telecommunication Union, as
well as the “Administrative Regulations” that
govern use of the spectrum, operations of
telecommunications
facilities,
and
coordination to avoid harmful interference
with other operators. The specific regulations
that govern spectrum and orbital band usage –
with comprise procedures for frequency
notification, coordination and registration of
transponders, primarily aimed at avoiding
harmful interference – are contained in the
Radio Regulations, which are administered by
the ITU Radiocommunication Sector and the
Radiocommunication Bureau. 30 Notably, the
constitution exempts military installations,
although states are urged to comply with the
rules “so far as possible,” especially with the
requirements for providing assistance in case
of distress and the avoidance of harmful
interference. 31 That said, most states comply,
including their military satellites and receiving
facilities, if for no other reason than to
establish legitimate rights for frequency
allocations and orbital slots. 32 While the ITU
system is a legal framework, the organization
has no enforcement powers, and member
states are essentially expected to comply in
good faith.

29
“Constitution of the ITU, Chapter I, Basic Provisions,”
http://www.itu.int/net/about/basic-texts/constitution/chapteri.
aspx (accessed April 2010).
30
“Radiocommunication Sector,” ITU, http://www.itu.int/
net/about/itu-r.aspx (accessed April 2010).
31
“Constitution of the ITU, Chapter VII, Special Provisions
for Radio, Article 48,” ITU, http://www.itu.int/net/
about/basic-texts/constitution/chaptervii.aspx (accessed April
2010).
32
Tim Bonds and et. al., “Employing Commercial Satellite
Communications: Wideband Investment Options for DOD,”
Project Air Force, RAND, Santa Monica, Calif., 2000, p.15,
see http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1192 (accessed
April 2010).
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Top-level policy, including possible revisions
to the Constitution of the International
Telecommunication Union, financial plans and
strategy, including plans for providing
technical assistance to developing countries
and setting equipment standards, are made by
ITU Plenipotentiary Conferences, which are
held
every
four
years.
The
next
Plenipotentiary Conference will be held in
Guadalajara, Mexico on 4-22 October 2010. 33
World Radiocommunication Conferences
(WRCs) are normally held every two to three
years, but in recent years the intervals have
stretched to four years. The WRCs are set to
review and revise the Radio Regulations and
the Table of Frequency Allocations, which
identify what portions of the spectrum can be
used by specific types of systems (such as
mobile telecommunications or broadcast
television), including allocating or reallocating
frequencies for uses by new technologies. 34 At
the last WRC, held 22 October to 16
November 2007, an agreement was reached on
assigning certain frequencies for international
mobile communications. 35 The next WRC is
set for 23 January to 17 February 2012.
The two formal meetings essentially serve as
fora for resolving disputes about spectrum and
slot allocations, rules, regulations and
technical standards. Each country gets one
vote at the Plenipotentiary and WRC
conferences, although in practice geographic
regions usually coordinate their voting.
According to ITU officials, however, every
effort is made at such meetings to obtain
consensus.
33
See ITU, http://www.itu.int/plenipotentiary/2010/index.html
(accessed April 2010).
34
See ITU, http://www.itu.int/ITU-R/index.asp?category=
conferences&rlink=wrc&lang=en (accessed April 2010).
35
“ITU World Radiocommunication Conference concludes
after four weeks: International treaty sets future course for
wireless,” ITU Press Release, 16 November 2007,
http://www.itu.int/newsroom/press_releases/2007/36.html
(accessed April 2010).

The process for allocating spectrum and an
orbital slot to an individual user is complex,
and can take a decade to resolve. Essentially, a
government must apply to the ITU for the
rights to use certain frequency bands and
orbital slots before launching a new satellite or
satellite network in any orbital plane, as well
as Earth stations for communications with
satellites and terrestrial stations within a
certain area of an Earth station. Governments
must apply even when the satellite owner and
operator is a private company; most
governments also include the majority of their
military satellites in the ITU process.
Assignments are given on a first-come, firstserve basis – provided that the proposed
system will comply with the existing Table of
Frequency Allocations and that no other user
nation objects. A state can object if the
proposed satellite’s operations will interfere
with the use of the same frequency bands by
users within its borders. 36
According to a background paper on spectrum
and orbit coordination procedures by the ITU
Radiocommunication Bureau, 37 the procedure
for application has three stages: (1) advance
publication; (2) coordination; and (3)
notification. The coordination process is a
formal regulatory obligation on all parties, and
the results confer rights and obligations on all
– and failure by a potentially affected
government to respond to the coordination
process within four months after publication
of the request is considered acceptance of the
new allocation. Once the coordination process,
which is complex and differs for different
types of systems, is completed, the applying
government must follow a set of procedures
for notification and registration of its new
assignments in the Master International
36

“Frequently Asked Questions,” ITU, http://www.itu.int/
ITU-R/terrestrial/faq/index.html#g005 (accessed April 2010).
37
This background paper was provided to the author thorough
personal correspondence with the ITU Radiocommunication
Bureau.
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Frequency Register that lists all ITU approved
allocations. However, governments are
obliged to bring the system into operation no
later than seven years following the advance
publication; failure to do so may cause the
applicant to lose the allocation.
While the ITU system is complex, it has been
successful in managing use of the limited
resources of spectrum and orbital slots on a
multilateral basis – also, due to the fact that
owners and operators are aware that avoiding
interference is in their own interests. One
critical key in the success of the ITU has been
the practice of reserving some frequency
allocations for new users from the developing
world, which has lessened, although not
totally
eliminated,
concerns
about
perpetuating the digital divide between
developed and developing states – given that a
majority of the satellites in operation are
owned and operated by governments or
companies registered in the developed world,
and that owners and operators do their best to
hang onto RF and slot allocations as long as
possible by piecemeal replacement of their
satellite networks. 38
However, satellite operators and ITU officials
say that in recent years there has been a trend
of more incidences of interference – including
deliberate interference – as spectrum and
orbital crowding has grown. The ITU defines
interference as: “The effect of unwanted
energy due to one or a combination of
emissions, radiations, or inductions upon
reception in a radiocommunication system,
manifested by any performance degradation,
misinterpretation, or loss of information,
which could be extracted in the absence of

38
For background on this issue, see: “Report on WRC-03
(Geneva, 9-June-4July 2003),” 29 July 2003, European
Radiocommunication Office website, http://www.ero.dk/wrc03 (accessed April 2010).
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such unwanted energy.” 39 It defines “harmful”
interference as that “which endangers the
functioning of a radionavigation service or
other safety services or seriously degrades,
obstructs, or repeatedly interrupts a
radiocommunication service operating in
accordance” with the Radio Regulations. 40
The first step in resolving interference issues
is for the parties involved to engage in
bilateral negotiations, and if the incident is
considered serious enough, the affected party
can alert the ITU. If bilateral discussions are
unsuccessful, the affected party can ask for the
assistance of the ITU Radiocommunication
Bureau in resolving the problem. However,
the ITU has no power to force the offending
party to stop the interference – it can only
arbitrate. While ITU officials say in most
cases a simple inquiry by the ITU usually
causes the offending party to find ways to
resolve the situation, in the case of deliberate
interference because of political issues, there
is not much recourse. According to an official
at the ITU Radiocommunications Bureau, at
the World Radiocommunication Seminar held
in Geneva 8-12 December 2008, there were 69
cases of harmful interference reported to the
ITU in 2008, 11 of which involved space
services and 58 of which involved terrestrial
services. 41
While most satellite interference is caused by
technical issues or operator error, there has
also been an increase in acts of deliberate
interference, such as jamming of satellite
broadcasts. The most recent incident involved
Iranian jamming of European satellite
39

“Glossaire,” RR1.166, ITU, http://www.itu.int/ITU-R/
terrestrial/seminars/glossary/index.html#Q0524
(accessed
April 2010).
40
Ibid.
41
Ben
Ba,
“Harmful
Interference,”
Document
WRS08/PRES/39-E, World Radiocommunications Seminar,
8-12 December 2008, Geneva (available on ITU website only
for ITU members.)
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broadcasts, especially those of Eutelsat
Communications headquartered in France.
The jamming began in earnest in December
2009 and worsened until 11 February 2010,
the anniversary of the Iranian revolution,
when according to a report in Reuters, some
70 Eutelsat radio and television programs
were being jammed. 42 In January 2010, French
officials asked the ITU to step in on the
matter, particularly in the case of jamming of
BBC World Television Persian language
broadcasts, which are carried by Eutelsat. 43
However, despite ITU efforts at intervention,
the Iranian jamming is continuing, according
to ITU officials. Indeed, the European Union
(EU) at a 23 March 2010, meeting of Foreign
Ministers called on Iran to stop the jamming,
and pledged to take action if the Iranian
government failed to respond – although,
exactly what action was not defined. 44 On 26
March 2010, the ITU’s radio regulations board
– in a first for the organization – issued a
public exhortation to Iran to stop the jamming.
“In this case there is evidence that there is a
deliberate attempt to block the satellite
transmissions and so they are saying this
should be stopped. This is prohibited under
the regulations.” 45 Iran has not admitted the
42

Luke Baker, “EU ready to act on Iran satellite jamming –
draft,” 19 March 2010, Reuters, http://www.alertnet.org/
thenews/newsdesk/LDE62I13N.htm (accessed April 2010).
43
Peter B. de Selding, “France Seeks ITU Help To Halt
Satellite Signal Jamming By Iran,” Space News, 8 January
2010, http://www.spacenews.com/satellite_telecom/100108france-seeks-itu-signal-jamming-iran.html (accessed April
2010).
44
“EU slams Iran’s jamming of satellite signals as
‘unacceptable’,” DW-World.DE Deutsche Welle, 23 March
2010, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5377813,00.html
(accessed April 2010). According to a Reuters report,
retaliation could include sanctions, such as blocking exports
or Eutelsat’s blocking Iranian broadcasts in retaliation. See
Luke Baker, “EU ready to act on Iran satellite jamming –
draft,” 19 March 2010, Reuters, http://www.alertnet.
org/thenews/newsdesk/LDE62I13N.htm (accessed April
2010).
45
Stephanie Nebehay, “UN tells Iran to end satellite
jamming,” Reuters, 26 March 2010, www.reuters.com/
article/idUSTRE62P21G20100326; and Luke Baker, “EU
ready to act on Iran satellite jamming – draft,” 19 March

jamming, and has responded to all concerns
by saying that it is investigating the matter.
Two other longstanding disputes that have
remained unresolved as well, despite ITU
intervention, involve Cuban allegations of
deliberate U.S. government jamming of radio
and television broadcasts from Cuba, and
interference with Slovenian broadcasts by
Italian broadcasters who, according to
Slovenian charges, are using uncoordinated
frequencies. 46 Discussions on both issues are
apparently continuing.
There is a concern among many in the satellite
industry that if instances of deliberate, or
wilfully ignored,
Although progress interference are
in the CD is not not resolved, nor
plausible for the punished, more
foreseeable actors might be
to
future, there is a tempted
violate the ITU
growing possibility rules – leading to
that diplomats at a breakdown of
the conference the system. A
will take up the breakdown of the
issue of “soft law” ITU regulatory
regarding space system would, in
the end, do no
activities… operator
any
good – as a break out of “interference wars”
would result in large-scale broadcast outages.
Eutelsat, in its 2010 report to the COPUOS
Legal Subcommittee, raised this issue with
regard to the Iranian jamming: “This matter
could affect the credibility in general of
satellites by posing a threat to the secure

2010, Reuters, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/
LDE62I13N.htm (both accessed April 2010).
46
See Peter B. de Selding, “France Seeks ITU Help To Halt
Satellite Signal Jamming By Iran,” Space News, 8 January
2010, http://www.spacenews.com/satellite_telecom/100108france-seeks-itu-signal-jamming-iran.html (accessed April
2010).
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transmission of programmes by satellites” and
asked the COPUOS Legal Subcommittee to
look into the issue as a violation by Iran of the
Outer Space Treaty. 47
Conference on Disarmament
The
Geneva-based
Conference
on
Disarmament was established by the General
Assembly in 1979 as the only multinational
forum dedicated to the negotiation of arms
control and disarmament treaties and
agreements, and currently has 65 member
states and about 40 observer states. It meets in
three annual sessions starting in January, and
takes decisions – including on procedural
issues such as a program of work – by
consensus. The CD has been debating the
question of “Prevention of an Arms Race in
Outer Space (PAROS) since 1985, when an
ad-hoc committee was formed – by consensus
– to examine the issue. This committee was
disbanded in 1994, and since then, discussions
of PAROS have taken place in the CD on an
informal basis. 48
Even though the United States was one of the
key counties that called for the development
of the CD ad-hoc committee, the chief
naysayer on any formal activity regarding
PAROS has been the United States, which in
the past has simply rejected the need for any
new space arms control agreements. As Karen
House, U.S. delegate to the 63rd Session of the
UN General Assembly, told the First
47
“Report on the activities of Eutelsat IGO to the forty-ninth
session of the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (2010), European
Telecommunications
Satellite
Organization
Intergovernmental
Organization
(Eutelsat
IGO),
http://sz0129.wc.mail.comcast.net/service/home/~/Eutelsat%2
0Igo%20statement%20to%20COPUOS%20LSC.pdf?auth=co
&loc=en_US&id=304020&part=2 (accessed April 2010).
48
See
“Outer
Space
Background
and
History,”
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/paros/osbackground.
html (accessed April 2010).
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Committee (the GA committee dedicated to
disarmament issues) on 20 October 2008:
“There is much rhetoric about the prevention
of an arms race in outer space. For nearly
three decades, the United States has
consistently pointed out that it is not possible
to define the nature of a space-based weapon.
The United States also believes it is not
possible to develop an effectively verifiable
agreement for banning either space-based
weapons or terrestrial-based anti-satellite
(ASAT) systems.” 49
Since the late 1990s and early 2000s, the
primary “movers” behind the PAROS agenda
at the CD have been China and Russia, which
long have been concerned by U.S. interest in
space-based missile defense – a program that
both nations view as a threat to their nuclear
deterrence capabilities. On 27 June 2002,
Russia and China introduced into the CD a
joint working paper, “Possible Elements for a
Future International Legal Agreement on the
Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in
Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force
Against Outer Space Objects.” 50 The paper
noted that there was an increasing threat of
“armed
confrontation
and
combatant
activities” in space, and it further stated:
“Only a treaty-based prohibition of the
deployment of weapons in outer space and the
prevention of the threat or use of force against
outer space objects can eliminate the emerging
threat of an arms race in outer space and
ensure the security for outer space assets of all
countries, which is an essential condition for
the maintenance of world peace.” 51
49

Karen E. House, “United States Public Delegate to the 63rd
Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” Delivered
in the Debate on Outer Space (Disarmament Aspects) of the
General Assembly’s First Committee, 20 October 2008, Arms
Control Update, U.S. Delegation to the Conference on
Disarmament, Geneva, http://geneva.usmission.gov/CD/
updates/1020OuterSpace.html (accessed April 2010).
50
See “CD,” http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/
speeches02/chiruswp_062702cd.html (accessed April 2010).
51
Ibid.
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Between 2002 and 2008, Russia and China
submitted a number of “non-papers” on
various issues related to PAROS, although the
CD itself was, and continues to remain,
deadlocked over its proposed agenda of work,
which also covers nuclear disarmament and
the potential negotiation of a treaty on fissile
materials – as states with different priorities
insisted on linking activities on one agenda
item with those on another, resulting in a longstanding lack of consensus as to just what the
CD ought to be discussing and negotiating. On
12 February 2008, Russian Foreign Minister
Sergey Lavrov, on behalf of Russia and China,
formally presented the CD with a draft treaty:
Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of
Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of
Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT),
and called for the immediate launch of CD
negotiations based on the draft. 52 Russia and
China also called on CD members to make
comments based on the draft as a foundation
for future discussions.
The United States administration of George
W. Bush objected to the draft treaty – the
administration
rejected
in
principle
multilateral treaties and pursued a policy of
“space control,” including the development of
offensive space capabilities. In particular, the
United States criticized the draft treaty text for
failing to bar development, testing, and
deployment of ground-based ASATs. 53 The
United States national security community had
been challenged in January 2007 by China’s
successful testing of a kinetic energy, hit-tokill, ASAT based on a ground-based rocket on
52

PPWT, http://reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/papers08/
1session/Feb12%20Draft%20PPWT.pdf (accessed April
2010).
53
Karen E. House, “United States Public Delegate to the 63rd
Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” Delivered
in the Debate on Outer Space (Disarmament Aspects) of the
General Assembly’s First Committee, 20 October 2008, Arms
Control Update, U.S. Delegation to the Conference on
Disarmament, Geneva, http://geneva.usmission.gov/CD/
updates/1020OuterSpace.html (accessed April 2010).

one of its own aging weather satellites. The
Chinese test, while breaking no new technical
ground – indeed, both the United States and
Russia tested ASAT systems in the 1980s –
did violate the norm of self-restraint on testing
of such weapons, created a large and
dangerous debris field that will continue to
threaten satellite operations for decades, and
elicited widespread concern about the renewed
potential for a space arms race. In the United
States, in particular, it hardened the attitudes
of those in national security policy-making
circles arguing for “space control” programs.
“Space is no longer a sanctuary,” said thenSecretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne.
“This change is seismic in nature.” 54
While the substance of U.S. concerns with the
PPWT did not change with the 2008 election
of President Barak Obama, the new
administration came into power with a much
different view than the previous one on the
value of multilateral diplomacy and fora. In
part, this new American flexibility helped
underpin the 29 May 2009 agreement to a
formal program of work (CD/1864) – for the
first time in more than a decade – which
included a decision to establish a working
group on PAROS “to discuss substantively,
without limitation, all issues…” 55 While
Russia and China expressed regret that the
breakthrough decision did not call for formal
PAROS negotiations, they did not insist on
linking the discussions to formal negotiations;
the lack of linkage to treaty negotiations was
exactly the reason that the United States could
sign on.
However, this new consensus at the CD to
move forward with a work program shattered
almost immediately after it was reached.
54

Michael Sirak, “Air Force Leadership: Chinese ASAT Test
Marked Turning Point; Space No Longer Sanctuary,” Defense
Daily, 12 February 2007.
55
See CD, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/
papers09/2session/CD1864.pdf (accessed April 2010).

Space and Defense, Summer 2010

Pakistan, reversing its decision to go along
with the program’s mandate for the launch of
negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff
Treaty, played out the rest of the CD’s 2009
session with a variety of procedural objections
to implementing the agreement. 56 At the
beginning of the CD’s January 2010 session, it
became even more clear that Pakistan had no
intentions of allowing treaty negotiations to go
forward due to concerns in the Pakistan
military about somehow bridging the gap
between its nuclear arsenal and that of India –
concerns that were exacerbated by the 2008
agreement by the Nuclear Suppliers Group to
endorse a civil nuclear cooperation agreement
between the United States and India.. 57 The
CD remains at a standstill with no resolution
in sight, despite the pressure for achieving
some measure of success at the review
conference of the foundational Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) and the
importance of fissile material negotiations to
forwarding the NPT goals.
Still, it is by no means clear that discussions
within the CD would result in the near-term or
medium-term establishment of negotiations on
PAROS or the PPWT. First of all, while the
Obama campaign signaled support for an
eventual space weapons treaty, the
administration’s
stance
has
shifted
considerably over the last year toward a more
cautious approach and, according to American
insiders, there is a serious debate within the
administration on what, if any, multilateral
agreements for space security should be
pursued. Led by the Department of Defense
(DOD), a review of U.S. national security

56

Jonathan Lynn, “Geneva nuclear arms talks fail to overcome
block,” Reuters, 31 August 2009, http://in.reuters.com/
article/worldNews/idINIndia-42108520090831
(accessed
April 2010).
57
Eric Auner, “Pakistan Raises New Issues at Stalled CD,”
Arms Control Today, March 2010, http://www.armscontrol.
org/act/2010_03/CDStalled (accessed April 2010).
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space posture was begun in May 2009. 58 In
July 2009, the National Security Council
began a review of U.S. National Space Policy,
last revised by the Bush administration in
2006. 59 The space
Efforts at posture review
was
multilateral originally
slated
to
be
approaches
finished by 1
toward developing February 2010,
new regulations but in January
and legal stalled and will
measures… now not likely be
remain difficult. completed until
The critical year end or even
the beginning of
obstacle… is the 2011.
While
desire to obtain Pentagon officials
consensus. cited the need to
wait for the new
National Space Policy before formally
deciding on a national space posture – which
would outline what space systems would be
pursued by DOD, the Air Force, and the
intelligence community – U.S. officials
familiar with the internal discussions also
noted that fierce infighting between the
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and
DOD on responsibility and budgeting for
satellite assets had contributed to the delay. 60
The National Space Policy review was
originally given a deadline of 1 October

58
Andrea Shalal-Esa, “U.S. harvesting canceled satellites for
future uses,” Reuters, 11 May 2009, http://www.reuters.com/
article/domesticNews/idUSTRE54A6HY20090511 (accessed
April 2010).
59
Frank Morring, “U.S. Space Policy Review Underway,”
Aviation Week & Space Technology, 22 July 2009,
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?c
hannel=space&id=news/Review072209.xml&headline=U.S.
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(accessed April 2010).
60
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2
February
2010,
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4481146 (accessed
April 2010).
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2009, 61 and then was delayed until December
2009, and as of today remains unfinished.
While the review is expected to call for a
renewed emphasis on multilateral cooperation
in space, there is little evidence that U.S.
agreement to PAROS negotiations on a space
weapons ban will be forthcoming, due to
ongoing concerns about the verifiability of
such a treaty. At the October 2009 session of
the General Assembly First Committee,
Garold Larson, then acting head of the United
States mission to the CD, said: “In
consultation with allies, the Obama
administration is currently in the process of
assessing U.S. space policy, programs, and
options for international cooperation in space
as a part of a comprehensive review of space
policy. This review of space cooperation
options includes a “blank slate” analysis of the
feasibility and desirability of options for
effectively verifiable arms control measures
that enhance the national security interests of
the United States and its allies.” 62
Second of all, despite China’s strong
diplomacy surrounding the need for a PPWT,
it remains unclear whether the Chinese
government would be willing to trade-off
ASAT development capabilities in exchange
for a space-based weapons ban. However,
Chinese diplomats over the last few months
have shifted their rhetoric to insist that an
ASAT ban could be considered in future
negotiations on the PPWT.
The Pentagon’s 2009 annual report to
Congress on Chinese military power, released
in late March 2009, stated that: “China is
61
Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, President Orders Sweeping
Policy Review,” 5 July 2009, Res Communis,
http://rescommunis.wordpress.com/2009/07/05/presidentorders-sweeping-u-s-policy-review (accessed April 2010).
62
Amy Klamper, “Obama Space Policy to Emphasize
International Cooperation,” Space News, 30 November 2009,
http://www.spacenews.com/policy/091130-obama-spacepolicy-emphasize-international-cooperation.html
(accessed
April 2010).

developing the ability to attack an adversary’s
space assets. People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
documents emphasize “destroying, damaging,
and
interfering
with
the
enemy’s
reconnaissance/
observation
and
communication satellites,” suggesting that
such systems, as well as navigation and early
warning satellites, could be among initial
targets of attack to “blind and deafen the
enemy.” The same PLA analysis of U.S. and
Coalition military operations also states that
“destroying or capturing satellites and other
sensors… will deprive the opponents of
initiatives on the battlefield and [make it
difficult] for them to bring their precision
guided weapons into full play.” 63
Concomitantly, willingness by China to
include terrestrial-based ASATs in any
discussions or negotiations would in essence
be a signal about China’s “good faith” on
efforts to prevent space weaponization – in
that while it is not certain that the United
States would under any
…there is a circumstances agree to
gathering negotiations of a spaceimpetus for based weapons ban, it is
certain that the United
“soft law” States would not enter
action to such negotiations without
mitigate the inclusion of terrestrialthe twin based ASATs. In addition,
problems India – with an eye to
of space rival China – has been
sending signals that it too
safety and is working to develop
security. ASAT capabilities. At a
January 2010 meeting of
Indian scientists, the director general of
India’s Defense Research and Development
Organization (DRDO) said that India is
63

“Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s
Republic of China 2009,” Office of the Secretary of Defense,
U.S. Department of Defense, http://www.defense.gov
/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Power_Report_2009.pdf
(accessed April 2010).
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“working to ensure space security and to
protect our satellites. At the same time, we are
also working on how to deny the enemy
access to its space assets.” 64
Many Indian experts now believe that India
would not be willing to negotiate any space
weapons treaty until it has successfully
demonstrated ASAT technologies. India’s
political and military elites, these experts say,
never reconciled themselves with the fact that
India’s failure to conduct a nuclear test prior
to the 1968 NPT accord demoted India to a
“have not” status, and are determined not to
make the same mistake again. “If and when
globally negotiated restraints are placed on
such strategic defensive systems or
technologies – perhaps restraints of some sort
of ASAT testing, hit-to-kill technologies –
India will already have crossed the technical
threshold
in
that
regard,
and
acknowledgement of such status [will be]
grand-fathered into any such future
agreement.” 65 Indeed, according to Indian
diplomats, the thinking in India is that efforts
toward PAROS have been superseded by
events, and that any international accords will
need to focus instead on managing the already
on-going ASAT arms race – and the time for a
treaty negotiation is nowhere near mature.
Needless to say, development by India of
ASATs would, in turn, almost assure similar
efforts by Pakistan – and thus mitigate any
support of a weapons ban treaty. And
certainly, if India resists near-term moves to
launch the PAROS talks, Pakistan will also.
Although progress in the CD is not plausible
for the foreseeable future, there is a growing
possibility that diplomats at the conference
will take up the issue of “soft law” regarding

space activities and norms in other fora. In
particular, Russia and the United States are
moving closer toward mutually embracing an
effort to push the UN General Assembly to
more formally take up the creation of TCBMs
under a so-called Group of Governmental
Experts (GGE) that would report to the
Secretary General, according to Russian and
American diplomats who have been involved
in recent bilateral talks on the issue of space.
The renewed interest in bilateral space
cooperation, including improved sharing of
orbital positioning data, stems largely from the
collision of an Iridium communications
satellite with a defunct Cosmos satellite in
February 2009 mentioned earlier.
Every year since 2005, Russia has been the
key sponsor of a General Assembly
Resolution calling for the development of
TCBMs. The latest version of the resolution
was adopted at the First Committee meeting in
October 2009 – and was significant because
the voting marked a change of U.S. policy
under the Obama administration. Rather than
voting against the resolution, as the United
States did during the Bush administration, the
United States abstained. 66 The resolution
invites all UN nations to submit concrete
proposals to the Secretary General and
instructs the Secretary General to compile a
report containing all the proposals for the
October 2010 meeting of the First Committee.
Russia has further proposed that future
TCBMs could be developed under three
categories: (1) measures aimed at enhancing
more transparency of space programs; (2)
measures aimed at expansion of information
on space objects in orbits; and (3) measures
related to the rules of conduct during space
66
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South_Asia/LA22Df01.html (accessed April 2010).
65
Ibid.

19

“Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer
space activities,” UN General Assembly, First Committee,
Sixty-fourth
Session,
16
October
2010,
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com09/
res/L40.pdf (accessed April 2010).

20

Theresa Hitchens/Multilateralism in Space: Opportunities and Challenges for Achieving Space Security

5. Thematic workshops:
-on various outer space research and
use issues, organized on bilateral and
multilateral
basis,
with
the
participation of scientists, diplomats,
military and technical experts. 68

activities. 67 More specifically, the Russian
proposal, which was submitted to the CD in a
14 August 2009 letter from Ambassador
Valery Loshchinin, calls for:
1. Exchange of information on:
-the main directions of the states’
outer space policy;
-major outer space research and use
programs;
-orbital parameters of outer space
objects.
2. Demonstrations:
-experts visits, including visits to
space launch sites, flight command
and control centers and other objects
of outer space infrastructure on a
voluntary basis;
-invitation of observers to launches of
spacecraft on a voluntary basis;
-demonstration of rocket and space
technologies.
3. Notifications of:
-the planned spacecraft launch;
-the scheduled spacecraft maneuvers
which may result in dangerous
proximity to spacecraft of other
states;
-the beginning of descent from orbit
of unguided outer space objects and
the predicted impact areas on Earth;
-the return from orbit into atmosphere
of a guided spacecraft;
-the return of a spacecraft with a
nuclear source of power on board, in
case of malfunction and danger of
radioactive materials descent to Earth.
4. Consultations:
-to clarify the provided information
on outer space research and use
programs;
-on ambiguous situations, as well as
other issues of concern;
-to discuss the implementation of the
agreed TCBMs in outer space
activities.
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U.S. diplomats state an interest in the
development of TCBMs on a voluntary basis,
and the United States and Russia are
conversing about the potential for convening a
GGE. The question for the United States will
be ensuring that the GGE, in its terms of
reference, does not directly link the
development of TCBMs with negotiations of a
PAROS treaty or the PPWT.
As China is traditionally a co-sponsor of the
UN General Assembly resolution on TCBMs,
and as all of the member states of the EU
voted for the latest version, it is likely that if
the United States and Russia agree on a GGE
that such a group will be established via a
resolution at the October 2010 First
Committee meeting, which would imply it
could start work in early 2011.
Meanwhile, the First Committee at the 2009
meeting also endorsed the draft “Code of
Conduct on Outer Space Activities” adopted
by the EU Council of Ministers in 2008. 69 The
proposed code, which was presented to the
CD in 2009, in effect would be another
approach to TCBMs by establishing best
practice guidelines for space activities and
pledging signatories to certain norms of
behavior. In particular, the draft code, which
would be voluntary, would pledge signatories
to: “refrain from any intentional action which
will or might bring about, directly or
indirectly, the damage or destruction of outer
68
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ILE/cd-1874.pdf (accessed April 2010).
69
Carol Naughton, “United Nations First Committee 2009,
Keeping Space Peaceful,” http://www.acronym.org.uk/
un/0905.htm (accessed April 2010).
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space objects unless such action is conducted
to reduce the creation of outer space debris
and/or justified by imperative safety
considerations.” 70
During the course of 2009, the EU consulted
with a number of non-EU states, including the
United States about the content of the draft
code, and is now in
the process of re- The fact
drafting the text. remains that
According
to what any one
European diplomats actor does in
and experts, the
space has the
hope is that a new
version can be potential to
adopted during the affect all others,
second half of 2010 whether
under the Belgian positively or
EU presidency and negatively.
then opened for
signature by other states – perhaps, via
COPUOS or through the UN General
Assembly, albeit the code is envisioned as a
free-standing accord along the model of the
Hague Code of Conduct on Ballistic Missiles
rather than a COPUOS or CD initiative.
Canada also has developed an initiative for
confidence-building measures, which has been
proposed to the CD as an alternative to the
Chinese-Russian PPWT. Submitted to the CD
as a working paper on 29 March 2009, and
codified as a CD document on 5 June 2009,
the Canadian proposal envisions “a
declaration of soft legal principles” that would
in effect provide a middle ground between the
EU draft code and the PPWT. 71 Accordingly,
70
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1865,
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2009,
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/C40D

21

Canada has suggested that the proposal could
be adopted either as a voluntary code or as a
legally binding treaty. The key provision of
the Canadian proposal would be a
commitment by states “not to test or use a
weapon against any satellite so as to damage
or destroy it,” as well as establish a ban on the
placement of weapons in space. 72 Canada
elaborated on its proposal in a statement to the
First Committee in October 2009, noting that
in addition to the two above proposed
commitments, states should also agree not to
use a satellite as a weapon. 73
Conclusions
Efforts at multilateral approaches toward
developing new regulations and legal
measures to ensure the sustained, safe, and
secure use of space remain difficult. The
critical obstacle for all three of the major
institutional frameworks – COPUOS, ITU,
and CD – on space governance is the desire to
obtain consensus. The CD is particularly
unable to reach agreements by the fact that
consensus is required, even for procedural
matters – a fact that is aggravated by the
linkages in the long-standing agenda between

0B92E5F37A9CC12575FC003BCE37/$file/CD_1865_E.pdf
(accessed April 2010).
72
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73
“Statement on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer
Space,” Permanent Mission of Canada to the UN, 19 October
2009, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/
C40D0B92E5F37A9CC12575FC003BCE37/$file/CD_1865_
E.pdf (accessed April 2010). While Canada would be most
interested in seeing its proposal adopted formally by the CD,
in either voluntary or treaty form, Canadian diplomats say that
the government is becoming increasingly frustrated with the
never-ending impasse of the CD. Thus, it is conceivable that
Canada may seek to push its proposal via other avenues –
considering that Canada was a leader in the passage of the
Ottawa Convention banning landmines (Convention on the
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction of 1997),
which was pursued as a free standing treaty outside of any
multilateral forum.
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nuclear disarmament, space security, and
conventional disarmament issues, each having
a different priority for different states.
From the struggles in all three fora, it is clear
that there is a widespread reluctance among
states to enact new legal restraints on space
activities in any domain. Indeed, some states
seem intent on avoiding the legal
responsibilities that they arguably already
have accepted. Thus, the development of any
new treaty in the near-term is unlikely –
whether it is designed to establish safety
measures or arms control for space.
On the other hand, it is apparent that there is a
gathering impetus for “soft law” action to
mitigate the twin problems of space safety and
security. This movement can be attributed to
the fact that over the last decade more states
have become “vested” in space, and thus now,
understand the need for cooperative behavior
in what is a “commons” environment. This
momentum could be furthered by the push by
the COPUOS Chairman to develop a UN
space policy. 74 Such a policy could serve to
build a better appreciation among UN
organizations and Member States about the
criticality of space operations to human
security and development, and to increase
space capacity in the developing world. A UN
space policy could serve as yet another driver
toward more urgent action to protect space
assets and avoid conflict that could endanger
the space environment for peaceful uses.
This advent of “soft law” approaches for space
should not be surprising, in that the same
phenomena took place in humankind’s
exploitation of the seas and the air. For
example, in the maritime arena, the United
74

Ciro A. Arévalo Yepes of Colombia is currently the
Chairman of COPUOS and will serve in that capacity until
2010. See “Towards a UN Space Policy,” 3 June 2009, 52nd
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States and Soviet Union, in 1972, signed the
Incidents at Sea Agreement to set “rules of the
road” for the actions of military ships and
aircraft on the high seas so as to avoid
accidents and accidental conflict. 75 This
bilateral confidence-building agreement –
which is not a treaty, and thus should be seen
as an instrument of soft law – was aimed at
applying, and amending, the Convention on
International Regulations for Preventing
Collisions at Sea also promulgated in 1972 –
although, based on an earlier 1960 agreement
on collision avoidance – by the International
Maritime Organization for civil ships on the
high seas. 76 The Incidents at Sea Agreement,
which still stands, includes, for example, a
prohibition on simulated attacks, as well as
basic navigational operations, such as
maintaining distance when conducting
surveillance operations on ships of the other
party. 77 In addition, military-to-military
meetings were prescribed to discuss any
incidents that did occur or concerns of either
party. The original U.S.-Soviet agreement has
been replicated by other states on bilateral and
multilateral bases since that time.
In the arena of air operations, the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was
created in 1944 under the Convention on
International Civil Aviation signed in
Chicago, and known as the Chicago
Convention, 78
in
order
to
establish
75
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text/sea1.htm (accessed April 2010).
76
Convention on International Regulations for Preventing
Collisions at Sea, International Maritime Organization,
http://www.imo.org/Conventions/contents.asp?doc_id=649&t
opic_id=257 (accessed April 2010).
77
Incidents at Sea Agreement.
78
“Chicago Conference – Introduction,” International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO), http://www.icao.int/cgi/
goto_m.pl?/icao/en/chicago_conf/intro.html (accessed April
2010).

Space and Defense, Summer 2010

international air routes and harmonize a set of
technical rules, including setting standards for
flight worthiness and air traffic control
procedures. 79 ICAO was established as a
specialized agency of the UN Economic and
Social Council. The convention was based on
many of the principles enshrined in the 1919
Paris Convention on Aerial Navigation,
agreed by 27 countries in the wake of World
War I, including the concept of sovereign
airspace and rights to peaceful overflights. 80
The Chicago Convention further granted each
state the right to prevent, for military reasons,
foreign aircraft from flying over certain
delineated airspace; outlaws foreign aircraft
carrying weapons, i.e., military aircraft, from
flying over national territory; and allows states
to prohibit photographic aerial reconnaissance
over their territory.81 The United States was
the key state pushing for a new aviation
convention, as both a way to incentivize trade
in the post World War II era, and restore
peace and security in Europe. 82 There are now
190 States signed as “contracting parties” to
the Chicago Convention and that participate in
ICAO activities.
Given developments in sea and air domains,
there is cause for optimism about the nearterm to mid-term development of a body of
voluntary, and perhaps regulatory, rules for
best practices, procedures, and behavior in
79
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space activities. In particular, the development
of norms – through codes of conduct – for the
use of space could lay the groundwork for
more robust efforts to reduce risks and avoid
conflict. Given that
…it [is] a trend toward an
abundantly clear ASAT arms race is
becoming
that integrated now
steps
multilateral plausible,
toward constraining
approaches to
this
dangerous
space security momentum should
are not a luxury, be a top priority for
but a necessity. the
established
spacefaring states.
It would therefore be incorrect to assert that
the continued failure of the international
community to find new legal pathways for
space governance and conflict prevention
means that the current multilateral institutions
themselves are failures. While progress along
these lines remains slow, there is progress
being made in all three bodies on the space
portfolio.
There also is a growing recognition that there
is a requirement for the three multilateral
space governance bodies to work more closely
together, to avoid duplication and working at
cross purposes. For one thing, lack of
coordination among COPUOS, ITU, and CD
have made it relatively easy for states to
practice “venue shopping” as a means of
preventing undesired actions. For example,
during the George W. Bush presidency, the
United States insisted that any discussions of
transparency
and
confidence-building
measures be restricted to COPUOS, which has
no remit over military space assets, in order to
ensure no constraints were developed on its
military space program, and that there was no
opening for a “slippery slope” in the
discussions toward PAROS. Likewise, Iran is
now insisting that the Eutelsat interference
issue remain inside ITU – which is largely
made up of technical specialists and where
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there are no mechanisms for enforcement –
rather than brought to the COPUOS for
discussion, which is more of a political body,
and where the issue could be raised of a
possible legal violation by Iran of its
obligations under the Outer Space Treaty as
well as the ITU Constitution.
However, it is becoming clearer to spacefaring
states that it is impossible, and indeed,
dangerous to attempt to create artificial
barriers between civil, commercial, and
military uses of space – in that all space assets
share the same vulnerabilities and are
fundamentally constrained by the laws of
physics. As Canada noted in its October 2009
statement to the First Committee, there is a:
...growing importance of renewed
efforts of UN institutions engaged in
the “governance structure” of space,
such as the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS) and the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU), to
collaborate more effectively in
addressing
cross-cutting
issues
affecting the continued utilisation of
outer space for peaceful purposes. 83

It will be particularly important for the two
bodies, COPUOS and ITU, to work more
closely together as the GEO belt becomes
more crowded, and if COPUOS begins to
discuss “best practice guidelines” for
operations in GEO – as the ITU already has
developed a body of standards. It would be, at
the least, a waste of time for COPUOS to
attempt to “reinvent the wheel,” and at worst,
a problem for satellite operators if COPUOS
attempts to override or unravel current
practice under ITU regulations. There is some
reason for concern, in that during the late
1990s, COPUOS and the ITU argued over
83
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defining the GEO belt – although, COPUOS’s
Legal Subcommittee had not established a
definition, many delegations questioned the
ITU’s legal capacity to define GEO orbits for
regulations. 84 One sign that COPUOS
members are aware of the need for
coordination came in the February 2010 report
of the Science and Technical Subcommittee,
which recognized the need for communication
with the ITU and other organizations and the
avoidance of duplication.
In addition, an effort to merge data from the
ITU’s frequency registry and the UN registry
of space objects managed by OOSA could
serve as a first step toward developing an
international data base of orbital positions that
will be critical not only for developing any
variant of a space traffic management regime,
but potentially for verifying any future space
arms control agreement. It is unlikely that the
international community will be satisfied with
continuing to rely on space surveillance data
provided by the United States military, if for
no other reason than political suspicion.
Canada and Russia, as key players in the space
security debate, are at the forefront of the
growing push for better coordination between
COPUOS and the CD in pursuit of TCBMs.
Again, it is sensible that the two bodies
establish better processes for sharing
information and for cooperative efforts, given
that any future TCBMs will by necessity
affect the conduct of civil, commercial, and
military space activities alike.
Further, in any future PAROS negotiations,
experts from COPUOS, and OOSA, and the
ITU could be useful in helping to elucidate
technical aspects of treaty proposals,
84
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particularly regarding verification. There is
precedent within the CD for experts from
specialized multilateral agencies to informally
assist with forwarding arms control talks; for
example, the International Atomic Energy
Agency has been routinely interacting with the
CD and member state delegations to explain
how its nuclear safeguards regime might be
translated into verification procedures for a
future Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty. There
has been, by comparison, almost no
interaction between the CD and COPUOS and
ITU on any basis – even for basic information
exchange about the activities of the latter two
bodies that might have impact on CD
deliberations. 85 The fact remains that what any
one actor does in space has the potential to
affect all others, whether positively or
negatively. This fact alone should make it
abundantly clear that integrated multilateral
approaches to space security are not a luxury,
but a necessity.

85

COPUOS officials could help in educating CD diplomats,
who are from foreign ministries and have little specialized
knowledge about space activities, about the importance of
protecting and sustaining the peaceful uses of space; and ITU
officials could be similarly useful in explaining technical
problems of avoiding RF interference, as well as helping to
identify what technical data could be useful for both TCBMs
and any form of a PAROS treaty.
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European Approaches to Space and Security:
Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation
Michael Searway
Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University

As complex security threats are increasing the
need for international cooperation on Earth,
the growing number of actors in space
increasingly demands collaboration in space
and security. This need is intensified by the
unique environmental attributes of space. For
example, debris from space assets can orbit
the Earth for years, rendering large areas of
orbital space unusable. Moreover, as space
becomes more crowded, the lack of
comprehensive
international
governance
amplifies the chance of mishaps above Earth.
This paper examines and considers the
prospects for space and security cooperation
between the United States and Europe. It
carries out this inquiry by focusing on
different European approaches in this area.
This issue is explored because the transatlantic
partnership, with the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) as its institutional
cornerstone, remains a durable and robust
alliance. Also, the United States and Europe
share many of the same values and interests
over a long history of cooperation, and their
partnership forms the core of multilateral
endeavors. Furthermore, in the past 60 years,
international cooperation and integration has
taken place in Europe. More recently, Europe
has become an emerging player in space and
security through some innovative initiatives,
and the European Union (EU) is playing a role
in space as a result of the Lisbon Treaty. 1

Transatlantic cooperation is necessary for
addressing security challenges on Earth and it
will be a crucial foundation for international
cooperation in space and security. However,
U.S. policy makers and space experts must
understand how processes in Europe over the
past 60 years have shaped what it is today.
This insight can help provide realistic
expectations of the direction Europe is
heading in space and security.
This paper offers such a forecast. It begins by
examining the historical development of
alternative European and Atlantic security
structures, thereby spelling out the principles
and preferences that guide Europe in
international relations. The paper then
discusses current developments in European
space and security cooperation before
assessing the prospects for transatlantic
cooperation in this area. Finally, the paper
concludes
with
several
policy
recommendations for enhancing transatlantic
cooperation in space and security.
Terms and Definitions
The term “space and security” refers broadly
to the safety of human assets in space, such as
satellites and spacecraft, and has two different
dimensions. One aspect involves the threat to
space assets posed by human-made space
debris, space weather, Near-Earth Objects

1

Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union
and the Treaty establishing the European Community
(hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon or Lisbon Treaty), signed 13
December 2007, and entered into force 1 December 2009,

http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_en.htm (accessed June
2010).
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(NEOs), accidental collisions with other space
assets, and unintentional radio interference.
The other aspect involves the threat posed by
intentional human disruption, such as radio
jamming, anti-satellite weapons (ASATs)
launched from Earth, and potential spacebased weapons. A wide view of space and
security addresses both of these hazards, and
draws on concepts developed in international
forums. The United Nations Committee on the
Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space Europe has
(COPUOS), for
become an
example, seeks
to ensure the emerging player in
space and
“long-term
sustainability”
security… and the
of outer space European Union is
activities
by playing a role in
mitigating both
space as a result
the human and
of the Lisbon
environmental
risks of space Treaty.
operations. The
draft EU Code of Conduct, discussed further
below, aims to “enhance the safety, security,
and predictability of outer space activities for
all” by establishing norms for human activities
in space. 2
“Space weapons,” in this paper, refers to
destructive weapons in space that can attack
targets on Earth, in the air, or in space. These
might include space-based missiles, lasers, or
a space fighter plane. Under this definition, no
space weapons have been deployed yet.
Although the term is broad, it is not allencompassing. For example, the United States
and China have already used missiles to
destroy their own satellites in space, but these
weapons were not designed explicitly to
2

Council conclusions and draft Code of Conduct for outer
space activities (General Secretariat, Council of the European
Union, 17 December 2008), http://www.stimson.org/
space/pdf/EU_Code_of_Conduct.pdf (accessed June 2010).

damage space objects nor were they deployed
in space. Furthermore, the Space Shuttle or
even satellites could hypothetically be used as
“weapons” to collide with and disrupt other
space assets. These all-inclusive definitions
would imply that the deployment of space
weapons has already occurred, and is not used
in this paper.
Space weapon issues are chiefly addressed by
the Outer Space Treaty (OST) 3 and the
Conference on Disarmament (CD). The OST
establishes, among other principles, that space
shall be used “for the benefit and in the
interests of all countries.” Regarding weapons,
the OST declares that states shall not “place in
orbit around the Earth any objects carrying
nuclear weapons or any other kinds of
weapons of mass destruction, install such
weapons on celestial bodies, or station such
weapons in outer space in any other manner.”
It does not, however, ban the deployment of
conventional weapons in space – the “space
weapons” mentioned above. Efforts to legally
ban space weapons have taken place since
1985, with little progress, in the CD, which
was established by the United Nations General
Assembly in 1979 to deal with a wide range of
multilateral disarmament issues. Most
recently, the CD has discussed a draft Treaty
on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in
Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force
against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), which
would ban the deployment of weapons of any
kind in space. 4
An adequate discussion of “space and
security” also needs to look at what Europe is
3

Treaty on Principles Governing Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and
other Celestial Bodies, United Nations Office of Outer Space
Affairs,
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/
outerspt.html (accessed June 2010).
4
Report of the Conference on Disarmament to the General
Assembly of the United Nations (Conference on Disarmament,
2009).
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doing in this area. Within this context, and in
addition to the safety of human assets in
space, space and security refers to the use of
space and space assets for security purposes
on Earth. Thus far, space assets have been
primarily used as force enhancers and
strategic enablers. For example, orbital
satellites make possible a range of capabilities
for security forces, including precision-guided
weapons, integrated communications, and
accurate navigation. Satellites can provide
intelligence on changes in terrain and weather,
as well as enemy movements and operations.
Space and security, as used herein, does not
refer to hypothetical force application from
space. Space weapons, if they were deployed,
could be used to attack targets on Earth for
security purposes, just as they could, in
theory, be used in space to protect assets from
enemies. As mentioned above, this paper does
not maintain that space weapons have been
deployed. Thus, force application could only
be a theoretical aspect of space and security
and is not covered herein.
Space and security issues are also tied to the
concept of “militarization” in space. In this
paper, militarization refers to military control
of space assets for military purposes. For
example, the United States military has
deployed satellites for the purposes of force
enhancement mentioned above. Thus, the
United States has militarized space, although
it has not deployed space weapons. However,
this concept is often complicated by dual-use
systems, which are space assets that can serve
multiple purposes. For example, Global
Positioning System (GPS) can help military
units navigate hostile terrain and help civilian
motorists navigate the Los Angeles freeway
system. Communications satellites can serve
both cell phone companies and security forces,
while satellite imagery can help plan a
military assault or construction of a city.
Spacecraft can be used to explore space or,
hypothetically, to attack other space assets or
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targets on Earth. Hence, the key aspect of
militarization is military control for military
purposes.
“Europe”
is
another term that
can have multiple
meanings. Here,
it refers to the
region of Europe,
as well as the
sovereign states
and institutions
that exist therein.
The EU is an
organization of
27
member
states.
It
is
essentially supranational
and
intergovernmental in economic issues, and
intergovernmental in political and security
issues. Within the EU, there are various
institutions with different responsibilities,
while member state governments retain their
national sovereignty. The European Space
Agency (ESA) is an intergovernmental
organization of 18 member states, two of
which are not in the EU, which seeks to
coordinate and develop the space capabilities
of its members. This paper differentiates
between the EU, the various EU institutions,
ESA, and the member states that are in each
organization. These actors are increasingly
seeking to cooperate on space and security
issues, as illustrated by the Structured
Dialogue that was established in 2007. This
dialogue brings together EU institutions with
space responsibilities, including the European
Union Satellite Centre (EUSC) and the
European Defence Agency (EDA), ESA, and
relevant member state agencies from the
organizations. 5

Transatlantic
cooperation is
necessary for
addressing
security
challenges on
Earth and it will be
a crucial
foundation for
international
cooperation in
space and
security.

5

Space and Security (European Commission/European Space
Agency, Joint Secretariat Paper, 2010).
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For clarity, this paper considers Europe to fall
within the borders of the Structured Dialogue,
meaning states within the EU and ESA. Thus,
developments and initiatives happening on a
European level are meant to incorporate the
Dialogue’s participants. Debates over future
EU membership, among others, indicate that
Europe is an arbitrary term. Other countries,
particularly those on the eastern boundaries of
Europe, can legitimately claim to be
European. Turkey, for example, is a member
of NATO and a major contributor to the
region’s security. However, the Structured
Dialogue involves the key actors in space and
security initiatives in the region, and thus,
delineates Europe in this paper.
Development of European and Atlantic
Security Structures
At the end of the Second World War in 1945,
Europe lay devastated. The battles of the
preceding six years were more mobile and
destructive than anything the world had seen
before. Millions of soldiers and citizens alike
had been lost to conflict and the privations of
war, and the cities, infrastructures, and
economies of Europe had been shattered.
Moreover, a threat still loomed in the east.
The Soviet Union, one of the victorious Allied
powers in the war, represented an ideological
rival to the United States and its allies. More
importantly, the Soviet Union commanded a
vast number of military forces, which were
now positioned within striking distance of
Western Europe.
Europe’s leaders realized they needed a new
way to ensure the security of their states. A
military commitment from the United States
was considered essential, and leaders on both
sides of the Atlantic agreed that they needed
to pool their limited resources in a collective
defensive effort. Moreover, the new speed and
destructiveness of war made an integrated

military approach necessary, because only
standing forces backed by plans for joint
action could hope to be militarily effective. In
particular, U.S. officials “favored an
integrated approach because it offered the
promise of combining the relatively small
armed forces of the European allies within a
larger collective effort that would make more
efficient use of the Europeans’ resources, but
without jeopardizing economic recovery in
Europe. The Europeans welcomed an
integrated approach because it offered the
prospect of a permanent claim on American
resources.” 6
Thus, NATO was formed in April 1949. It
originally consisted of 10 European states in
addition to the United States and Canada.
Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty states
that an attack against one of the members in
Europe or North America is an attack against
them all; each member, in coordination with
the others, will take whatever action it deems
necessary to restore and maintain security in
the North Atlantic area. 7 The treaty also
establishes a council to oversee NATO, as
well as goals of collective defense and the
preservation of peace and security.
NATO was not the only European institution
created following World War II. In addition to
the Soviet threat, there were residual fears in
Europe, especially in France, over a rearmed
Germany. Accordingly, the French pushed for
the creation of a European Defence
Community (EDC), which would help ensure
that German rearmament would be structurally
controlled. The EDC was developed alongside
the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC), which was designed to control the
war-making capacity of Germany. The logic
6
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Press, 2009).
7
The
North
Atlantic
Treaty,
4
April
1949,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm
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behind these organizations was that “binding
the countries of Europe closely together in
integrated institutions would make war
impossible between them.” 8 Defense was thus
being used as a mechanism to advance
integration; there were also debates taking
place about developing a European political
community.
The EDC Treaty was signed in May 1952 with
the support of the United States, which saw
the “EDC as
essential to give As the European
NATO a stout Union begins to
and dependable
deploy space
heart.” 9
However,
the assets for an
British refrained increasing number
from joining the of security-related
treaty,
mainly functions, European
because they still officials… have
felt they had a
expressed the need
broad range of
national interests for measures to
and were hesitant protect those
to
become systems.
involved in a
supranational organization on the European
continent. The United States did not press the
issue for fear of delaying the EDC. However,
there were doubts as to whether France could
manage Germany by itself. Consequently, the
French rejected the EDC treaty when it was
seen to lack firm commitments from Britain
and the United States. The treaty’s failure
raised uncertainties about the political will
within Europe to contribute to the common
defense. Most significantly, the lack of
European unity threatened to reduce the
United States commitment to the continent,
which was partly predicated on a European
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willingness to join together and contribute to
their collective good. 10
In order to preserve the United States presence
and facilitate controls on German rearmament,
Britain arranged a series of agreements that
created the Western European Union (WEU)
in 1954. The WEU was formed from the
Western Union, itself a defensive alliance
founded in 1948 between France, Britain,
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.
Germany and Italy became members of the
new organization; Britain also pledged several
divisions and a Tactical Air Force to the
continent. Unlike the supranational EDC, the
WEU was an intergovernmental actor; it
functioned as a “facilitating mechanism” to
enable NATO to play the leading defense role
in Europe. Instead of deterring an external
threat, the WEU served as a “reconciler of
differences between allies.” 11
To some states, like Britain, the formation of
the WEU showed the inability of European
states to agree on a defense structure without
U.S. guidance. In economic matters, however,
European integration continued from the
foundations of the ECSC. In 1957, the Treaty
of Rome established the European Economic
Community (EEC), an organization of six
European states designed to foster economic
cooperation and integration. Six additional
states later joined the EEC, including Great
Britain. In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht was
signed by the EEC’s members, creating the
EU from the original organization. Maastricht
established three pillars of the EU. The first
was the European Community, which
incorporated the EEC and dealt with economic
matters. The common market of the EEC
became the EU single market, which
facilitates the free flow of goods, capital,

8

G. Wyn Rees, The Western European Union at the
Crossroads (Westview Press, 1998).
9
Edward Fursdon, The European Defence Community: A
History, (Macmillan, 1980).
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people, and services within the EU. This
single market also acts as a customs union,
which applies a common external tariff on all
goods entering the market. In 2002, twelve of
the EU’s member states began using a
common currency, the euro, essentially
completing a 45 year long process of
economic integration.
In the first pillar, the EU acted as a
supranational body; its decisions were binding
on its member states and did not always
require unanimity. The Council of the EU,
which
brings
together
the The development
ministers of each
of European SSA
member state, had
the
ultimate capabilities has
authority in these been viewed as
legislative areas, an important first
as it did in all step toward
areas falling under protecting
EU competence.
European space
The
European
Council,
which assets.
brings
together
the heads of state from each EU member, is
the highest configuration of the council and
the EU’s ultimate decision making body.
However, the European Commission had the
responsibility for proposing legislation in
economic areas, and the council gave it
primary responsibility for implementing
legislation. The commission is made up of 27
commissioners, one from each member state,
who are supposed to act independently on
behalf of the EU as a whole.
The Maastricht Treaty’s second pillar was the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP),
and the third was Police and Judicial
Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCC). In
these areas, the council had ultimate
responsibility for all decisions. In contrast
with the first pillar, these pillars were
intergovernmental;
decisions
required

unanimity and were not binding on member
states. The CFSP and PJCC were designed to
coordinate the policies of the EU’s member
states, aligning them as closely as possible,
while allowing for national autonomy over
sensitive security matters. The CFSP included
the European Security and Defence Policy
(ESDP), which was created to harmonize EU
military and defense policies.
As with nascent European security structures
in the 1940s and 1950s, the development of
the ESDP has been marked by tension
between collective security and national
sovereignty. Furthermore, there has been a
divide within the EU about the ideal direction
of the ESDP. Some states, led by France, have
wanted to build-up the ESDP as an
independent European alternative to NATO.
Other states, led by Great Britain, have
preferred to develop the ESDP within the
transatlantic framework of NATO. In an
attempt to address some of the institutional
and jurisdictional questions of the EU-NATO
relationship, the Berlin-plus agreement of
2003 enables the EU to use NATO structures,
mechanisms, and assets to execute military
operations if NATO declines to act. 12
Some European security missions are carried
out by the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which
evolved from the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The CSCE
began in 1975, when 35 heads of state from
North America and Europe, including General
Secretary Brezhnev from the Soviet Union,
met and signed the “Final Act,” which
included ten normative principles to guide
international relations. These principles
included the peaceful settlement of disputes,
nonintervention in internal affairs, respect for
12
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human rights, and fulfillment of obligations
under international law. 13 The CSCE
consequently established a link between the
political-military aspects and the human
dimensions of security. It also developed
confidence-building measures (CBMs) in the
realm of military security, and called for
cooperation in economic, scientific, cultural,
and educational fields.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union,
the heads of state of the CSCE met in 1992.
The original intent of the leaders was mainly
to create temporary, ad-hoc missions to deal
with conflicts as they arose. However, by this
time, the CSCE had become the “principal
venue for negotiating, verifying, and
discussing the enforcement of the major nonnuclear arms control measures on the Eurasian
continent.” 14 It had also developed a broad set
of instruments for use in conflict management
throughout the territory of its member states in
Eurasia. Thus, at the 1994 Budapest Summit,
the CSCE became the OSCE, a fully
institutionalized
regional
security
organization. While the OSCE developed a
permanent secretariat, it remained a political
organization, which was thought to be more
flexible than a collective, legal institution. The
Budapest Summit also produced a Code of
Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of
Security, which created a regional normative
framework for all aspects of military activity,
including civil-military relations and the
conduct of warfare. 15
Although it has limited resources and is often
overlooked, especially in the United States,
the OSCE has managed to persist and
accomplish a number of objectives due to
several unique attributes. The OSCE
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responded more directly than other European
security institutions to the specific threats that
emerged with the collapse of the Soviet
Union, such as ethno-political conflict and
violence as states divided along ethnic lines.
Now consisting of 56 members, it is the only
pan-European security organization with
universal membership. 16 The OSCE’s greatest
assets include its ability to strengthen
democratic
institutions
in
transitional
societies, thus alleviating potential conflicts,
and its capacity to respond rapidly to crises.
Nevertheless, NATO remains the chief
military and defense institution in Europe,
with responsibility for the continent’s
territorial defense.
Thus far, It continues to
transatlantic exist 60 years
cooperation in after its creation,
space and and 20 years after
security areas the demise of the
has been limited. Soviet Union, the
main
security
threat that prompted its formation. NATO has
endured, and will continue to endure, because
it is an alliance of liberal democracies that
contains self-healing tendencies. First, there is
an attraction felt by democracies to working
closely with each other; moreover, the internal
workings of democracies enhance their
suitability as long-term allies, both due to their
emphasis on consultation and cooperation, and
their continual changeover of political
leaders. 17 Thus, NATO’s member states have
managed to work through various crises
without breaking up the alliance. While some
observers claim that the current NATO
mission in Afghanistan is a critical test for its
future existence, it will probably only
determine whether or not NATO will carry out
future missions beyond its borders.
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After its creation, the WEU also remained
involved in European security issues in three
ways: as a channel of intra-European
communication and conflict resolution, as part
of the debate about U.S. leadership on the
continent, and as an element in the evolution
of European integration. 18 In June 1992, at the
Hotel Petersberg in Germany, the WEU laid
out three types of security tasks it planned to
undertake:
humanitarian
operations,
peacekeeping, and the employment of combat
forces in crisis management. 19 These
“Petersberg Tasks” were adopted by the new
ESDP in 1997.
Shortly
after, There continues
the WEU began to be a major
to transfer its capabilities gap
capabilities and between the
functions to the United States and
EU. After the
Europe, both in
Lisbon Treaty
entered
into general defense
force
on
1 and in space.
December 2009,
the member states of the WEU collectively
decided to close the organization. WEU
activities are planned to cease by June 2011.
The Lisbon Treaty marks another major step
forward in EU integration. It is designed to
streamline some of the decision-making
processes in the EU and to give the EU greater
coherence and capabilities, especially in
international relations. This development has
been partly motivated by the EU’s relative
weakness in foreign and military affairs.
While the EU is an economic power rivaling
the United States, it remains far behind its
transatlantic partner in defense capabilities.
Under the Lisbon Treaty, qualified majority
voting (QMV) has been extended to 40 policy
18

G. Wyn Rees, The Western European Union at the
Crossroads (Westview Press, 1998), p. 10.
19
Petersberg Declaration, Part II (Council of Ministers,
Western European Union, 1992).

areas, meaning the Council of the EU and
European Council can make decisions without
unanimity. The rule of “co-decision” has
become the regular legislative procedure. This
puts the European Parliament on equal footing
with the European Council for most
legislation areas, notably including the budget.
The parliament is the only directly-elected EU
institution, and it is intended to represent the
citizens of the member states. The European
Commission remains the only EU institution
that can initiate proposals for legislation. In
addition, its Vice-President serves as the High
Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy and chairs the foreign
affairs configuration of the Council of the EU.
Furthermore, the ESDP has become the
Common Security and Defence Policy
(CSDP), which establishes the principle of
enhanced cooperation for groups of states that
want to collaborate on security issues.
Autonomy in national defense decisions is
kept intact, however. 20 Notably, the CSDP
takes on both a civil and a military dimension,
recognizing the importance of a broad-based
approach to today’s security issues. 21
The Lisbon Treaty makes a number of other
changes as well. Significantly, it officially
establishes space as an area of shared
competence between national governments
and the EU institutions in Brussels. Space is
also one of the new areas covered by QMV, as
well as co-decision. Specifically, the treaty
states that the EU “may promote joint
initiatives, support research and technological
development, and coordinate the efforts
needed for the exploration and exploitation of

20
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space.” It may also establish “any appropriate
relations” with the ESA. 22
In practice, there remain many questions over
how the Lisbon Treaty will impact EU affairs.
Baroness Catherine Ashton, the High
Representative, is still struggling to set up the
EU’s new diplomatic corps, the European
External Action Service (EEAS). In doing so,
she must manage the demands of the council’s
external
relations
department,
the
Commission’s
Directorate-General
for
External Relations, and the member states’
diplomatic services for positions and
influence. 23 In addition, the European
Parliament is seeking to ensure that it has
adequate oversight of the EEAS. Furthermore,
the
Lisbon
Treaty has not … there is an
yet created a interoperability
coherent EU. problem between
The
Lisbon U.S. and European
Treaty created forces, which
the position of
hampers space and
President of
the European security
Council,
a cooperation.
politician who
is elected for renewable terms of two-and-ahalf years. The President chairs EU summits,
although ministerial meetings continue to be
chaired by the country holding the six-month
rotating EU presidency. 24 The President of the
European Commission, who heads and
represents that institution, is another key
decision maker, in addition to the leaders from
all 27 member states. In the ongoing crisis in
the euro zone, these leaders have struggled to
organize a unified EU response, and it is
unclear who will do so in the future. Finally, it
is not yet certain how the Lisbon Treaty
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affects the implementation of EU legislation.
Due to rules which give it more oversight, the
European Parliament may become more
willing to delegate implementation to the
European Commission. At the same time, the
parliament will have more work to do in
examining measures drafted by the
commission, and will probably spend much
more time scrutinizing the implementation of
EU policy and law. 25
European Space and Security
Cooperation
European cooperation in space has reflected
the broader process of European integration,
although it has largely taken place outside the
formal EU framework until recently.
Realizing that national projects would not be
able to compete with the United States and the
Soviet Union, European scientists in the 1950s
and 1960s pressed their governments to
establish organizations for space cooperation.
Originally, there were two European space
organizations – the European Launch
Development Organisation (ELDO) and the
European Space Research Organisation
(ESRO). ELDO and ESRO were merged in
1975 to form ESA, which is now an
intergovernmental organization of 18 member
states, two of which, Norway and Switzerland,
are not EU members. The ESA Charter states
that its purpose is “to provide for, and to
promote, for exclusively peaceful purposes,
cooperation among European States in space
research and technology and their space
applications, with a view to their being used
for scientific purposes and for operational
space applications systems.” 26
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In recent years, ESA officials have commonly
interpreted “peaceful purposes” somewhat
loosely, allowing for non-aggressive activities,
such as military-support architectures and
peacemaking missions. 27 This interpretation
has enabled EU… Europe
ESA cooperation
in security areas. generally prefers
The first ever to use “soft power”
European Space in international
Policy
(ESP), politics… as
released in 2007, opposed to hard
is
a
joint
military power.
document of the
European Commission and the Director
General of ESA; it was compiled in
consultation with the member states of both
organizations
and
other
interested
stakeholders. The ESP states that “Europe
needs an effective space policy to enable it to
exert global leadership in selected policy areas
in accordance with European interests and
values.” Among other objectives, its strategic
mission seeks “to meet Europe’s security and
defence needs in regard to space.” The ESP
also stresses the need for establishing a
European Space Program and coordinating
national and European level space activities,
increasing synergy between defense and civil
space programs and technologies, and
developing a joint international relations
strategy in space. For specific applications, the
ESP lists satellite navigation, Earth
observation, satellite communications, and
security and defense. In the last area, it notes
that “space system needs for planning and
conducting civilian and military crisis
management operations overlap.” While
“military capability will continue within the
remit of Member States… Sharing and
27
Agnieszka Lukaszczyk, Laurence Nardon and Ray
Williamson, “Towards Greater Security in Outer Space: Some
Recommendations,” Assessing the Current Dynamics of
Space Security (French Institute of International Relations and
Secure World Foundation, 2009), http://www.swfound.
org/siteadmin/images/files/file_384.pdf (accessed June 2010).

pooling the resources of civilian and military
space programmes, drawing on multiple use
technology and common standards, would
allow
more
cost-effective
solutions.”
Furthermore, the ESP states that the EU will
lead in “identifying and bringing together user
needs” and setting policy objectives, while the
ESA
will
primarily
develop
space
28
technologies and systems.
Michael Taverna accordingly observes there is
“growing pressure within the EU to harness
space for bolstering security and defense
capabilities, combined with a trend among EU
states toward greater military space
cooperation.” 29 The military use of space
remains a sensitive issue, however. Several
EU and ESA member states have their own
military space programs and national leaders
have been reluctant to establish similar
programs at the European level. 30 This
hesitance reflects the desire of member states
to retain control over their defense policies
and military programs, which has complicated
the development of the CSDP.
Instead, ESA has been asked by the European
Council, Commission, and Parliament to
develop dual-use systems that can fulfill
security functions. A European Parliament
resolution of 2008, for example, calls for
encouraging “synergies between civilian and
security developments in the field of space.” 31
Highlighting the contentiousness of this area,
the Parliament’s own press release on the
28
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resolution proclaimed that the “Parliament
emphasizes that the use of space must serve
exclusively non-military purposes, rejecting
any direct or indirect military use.” 32 At the
same time, it maintained that “uses made of
Galileo, EGNOS [European Geostationary
Navigation Overlay Service] and GMES
[Global Monitoring for Environment and
Security] by any military users must be
consistent with the principle that these are
civilian systems under civilian control.” The
confused nature of this statement implies
parliament approval of using space assets for
security purposes, despite its assurance that
EU space programs will not be militarized.
The Galileo and GMES projects are two key
examples of dual-use systems at the European
level. Galileo, when active, will provide
navigation services similar to GPS. Its two
primary contributors are the European
Commission’s Transportation Directorate and
ESA. Galileo will provide services of several
different qualities; most notably, the Public
Regulated Service (PRS) will provide data for
users, mainly governmental, who require
service continuity and completely secure
access. The Galileo Supervisory Authority
(GSA) has been created to oversee the project
and prevent any hostile or unauthorized use of
its services. Thus, while it remains under
civilian control, Galileo’s security functions
are unambiguous.
Similarly, GMES has evolved from an
observational
system
to
monitor
environmental security to one that monitors
environment and security. A working group of
2002, made up of representatives from 11 EU
member states, determined that GMES could
address four areas of European security:
environmental and technological crisis
32
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prevention and rapid reaction, conflict
prevention and treaty verification, Petersberg
mission support, and European border
surveillance. 33 GMES is also a joint initiative
between the EU and ESA.
Other space and security initiatives are also
underway, both at the European level and
between smaller groups of states. The EU
Satellite Centre, which originally belonged to
the WEU, supports CSDP decision-making
through analysis of satellite imagery, although
this imagery has mostly been purchased from
commercial providers. The European Defence
Agency (EDA),
… space and created in 2004
security is an area to support and
ESDP
with potential for sustain
capabilities,
is
deeper also active in
transatlantic assuring that the
collaboration. next generation
of military, or
dual-use reconnaissance, satellites is built as a
network rather than independently. Six
countries, including France and Germany,
have already formed a group to design the
Multinational Space-Based Imaging System
(MUSIS) to assure that future reconnaissance
systems can be used by all members. These
states are also working on a Common
Operational Requirement, known by its
French acronym BOC, with the ambition to
start “a high-level cooperation process aiming
at solidifying, and possibly guaranteeing,
longer-term multilateral military space
cooperation.” 34 BOC is indicative of a bottomup approach to space and security in Europe,
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as opposed to one originating from the EU
institutions. 35
As the EU begins to deploy space assets for an
increasing
number
of
security-related
functions, European officials and space
experts have expressed the need for measures
to protect those systems. A panel of space and
security experts organized by the European
Commission noted that Europe “needs to
consider the range of protection measures
needed to ensure successful operation of both
civil and military satellite systems, including
defensive anti-jam countermeasures. Part of
the requirement for protection of assets
includes the ability to monitor what is
happening in space in order to ensure that we
understand whence might originate sources of
potential threat.” 36
A broadly based conference in October of
2009 on the “The Ambitions of Europe in
Space,” which included remarks from
President Barroso of the European
Commission and Director General Dordain of
ESA, reached similar conclusions. The
conference proceedings state that European
“space assets and infrastructure are
indispensible for our economy and security,
and we need to protect them.” 37 To help
achieve this goal, ESA is developing a space
situational awareness (SSA) system, which
will provide services in three main areas:
surveillance and tracking of objects in orbit,
monitoring of space weather, and detection of
NEOs. SSA will provide “rapid and precise
information to satellite operators, and to a
wide range of civil, industrial, and

35
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government users.” 38 A meeting of June 2009
involving the commission, the council, and
EU member states with relevant space
surveillance capabilities concluded that SSA
“should be based on a distributed, multilayer
network approach. It should build on existing
European and national capabilities and
assets.” 39 Notably, SSA is the first European
space initiative to consider dual-use
dimensions from the outset. ESA will gather
civilian SSA user requirements and design the
technical architecture of a potential European
capacity, and the EDA is currently drafting
military requirements for the system. 40
The development of European SSA
capabilities has been viewed as an important
first step toward protecting European space
assets. Within European circles, there has
been
no
discussion
of
deploying
countermeasures against potential human
threats in space, such as space weapons.
Instead, the EU has been seeking to ensure
space and security largely through diplomatic
efforts and establishing rules of the road. In
December 2008, the European Council
adopted a draft Code of Conduct for outer
space activities. The Code emphasizes three
principles to guide an approach to space and
security: freedom of access to space for all for
peaceful purposes, preservation of the security
and integrity of space objects in orbit, and due
consideration for the legitimate defense
interests of states. 41 It also refers to
transparency
and
confidence-building
38
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measures, similar to past arms control
agreements, which are designed to alleviate
anxieties over the potential deployment of
weapons in space. The council is using the
draft code as a basis for consultations with
other countries.
Although the code strongly affirms the
principle of no harmful interference against
space objects, it does not explicitly mention
weapons in space, and notably allows for the
consideration of national defense interests.
While this may partly be due to difficulties in
defining space weapons, the code also seems
designed to be acceptable to a wide range of
states, including the United States. It is a
realistic alternative to a binding legal
document against space weapons, which has
proven to be complicated and difficult to
negotiate due to political resistance and
technical complexities. While the code is
inherently incapable of preventing deployment
of space weapons by itself, it is an important
diplomatic initiative in the debate over space
and security.
A March 2010 conference on space and
security brought together policy makers from
several organizations, including ESA member
states, the EU, and the EDA. The conference
re-affirmed the “relevance of space to security
users as a tool with the potential to address
specific needs, in particular that of timely
response.”
Echoing
earlier
proposals,
recommendations were made on how GMES
could support environmental protection
efforts, border and maritime surveillance, and
the work of the nascent EEAS. The
conference raised the importance of SSA for
space and security, but also noted “the
complexity of integrating both civil and
military requirements.” Its conclusions stated
that the “EU Council and European
Commission, together with potential SSA
contributors, will have to define the
governance model and the related data policy
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for an operational European SSA system.” In
addition, the conference highlighted the
importance of national assets as components
of European space systems. The conference
conclusions referenced the ESP in stressing a
need for the EU, ESA, and their member
states to “increase synergies between their
security and defence space activities and
programmes.” 42
Implications for Transatlantic
Cooperation in Space and Security
Thus far, transatlantic cooperation in space
and security areas has been limited. For
example, NATO forces have been mostly
reliant on U.S. space assets, while EU forces –
and many member state forces – have lacked
many of the technological benefits of space
systems. Yet, there has been some
cooperation, as well as discussion on future
joint endeavors. NATO has developed allied
space-based telecommunications through a
program called NATO Satcom Post-2000.
This program will ideally define how future
cooperation between allied information
systems will work, and establish common
technical standards. Establishing Satcom was
difficult, however, as NATO governments had
trouble agreeing on their choice of wave
frequencies – the United States wanted a highfrequency standard, while most of the other
members preferred one with a lower
capacity. 43
42
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U.S. defense officials have also expressed
openness to cooperating on SSA. 44 One U.S.
official of the Department of Defense asserted
that “any endeavor by Europe to enhance
[SSA] will only increase our ability to conduct
safe
and
… technical
responsible
operations in coordination, as well
space...
we as rules of the
look forward road… may govern
to continued
the security
exchanges on
a range of dimensions of
space. The
technical,
architectural
European Union
and
related could be a driver in
issues.” The this kind of
official added
development.
that the United
States hosted a
U.S.-ESA workshop in June 2008 that
addressed transatlantic cooperation on SSA. 45
Discussions between U.S. and European
officials on possible SSA data sharing have
been ongoing, and have sought to address
evolving SSA security policy concerns. 46 At a
conference hosted by the New Defence
Agenda, Gilles Maquet of Eurospace
identified early warning systems as another
area for potential cooperation. 47 Karl von
Wogau, a member of the European
Parliament, made a similar proposal in a
parliament resolution: “EU and NATO are
urged to launch a [strategic] dialogue on space
44
Aviation Week & Space Technology of 19 January 2009,
noted that reports had surfaced that the United States was
putting pressure on Europe to sidetrack or change SSA
projects in Europe. This report was confirmed as well by
ESA’s Director General Dordain through personal
correspondence with the author.
45
Michael Taverna, “ESA plans quick kickoff for space
situational awareness and other programs, despite alleged
U.S. pressure,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 19
January 2009.
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“Conversation with Ken Hodgkins,” Aerospace America,
July-August 2009, pp. 16-19.
47
John Chapman, Space and Security in Europe (New
Defence Agenda, 2004).

policy and missile defence, especially on
complementarity and interoperability of
systems for satellite communications, space
surveillance, and early warning of ballistic
missiles, as well as the protection of European
forces by a theatre missile defence system.” 48
Despite talk of future collaboration, as well as
a long history of working together in many
areas, there are several issues which pose
challenges to U.S.-European cooperation in
space and security. There continues to be a
major capabilities gap between the United
States and Europe, both in general defense and
in space. In 2009, the United States spent
$43.5 billion on military space, where the
Department of Defense’s space budget was
$26.5 billion, and the budgets for the National
Reconnaissance
Office
and
National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency were $15
billion and $2 billion respectively. 49 In
contrast, it is estimated that Europe as a whole
spends between $750 million to $1.4 billion
annually on military space. 50 Europe’s more
limited military space budget severely restricts
Europe’s ability to acquire advanced military
space assets.
The ongoing crisis in the euro zone will likely
complicate this situation. In early May, the EU
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
funded a massive loan package to rescue
Greece from bankruptcy. A few days later,
they established a mechanism worth around
€750 billion to rescue failing EU member
states in the future. The measures were
unpopular in Germany, which was the biggest
contributor to the funds. At the same time,
states throughout Europe began to implement
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austerity programs to reduce their debts. 51
Moreover, the expanded powers of the
European Parliament under the Lisbon Treaty
should make the EU more accountable to its
citizens, although recent voter turnout for
parliament elections has been low. Faced with
potential cuts in other areas, like social
welfare, European citizens are unlikely to
support additional security space spending, at
the European or national levels.
Due to these budgetary limitations, there is an
interoperability problem between U.S. and
European forces, which hampers space and
security cooperation. John Sheldon notes that
the United States “is hardly going to rein back
its continued exploitation of military space in
order to ensure that European allies can
operate
effectively
alongside
it.” 52
Interoperability problems were also cited by
several of the experts at the New Defence
Agenda conference mentioned above.
Additionally, a report to the ESA Director
General, commonly known as the “Wise Men
Report,” stated that increased space and
security investment would establish Europe’s
“credentials both as a credible alternative to
the United States for the world and as a
credible partner for cooperation with the
United States.” 53
While improved European space capabilities
are essential for increased cooperation with
the United States, they could also fuel calls for
greater European autonomy in space and
security. This paradox is more complex than
the capabilities gap itself, and is tied to a

41

deeper transatlantic divide. The call for
European autonomy has typically been led by
France; France has advocated a stronger
CSDP as an alternative to the United States
and NATO. Former French President Jacques
Chirac argued that unless Europe develops its
own satellite capabilities, it will remain little
more than a “vassal” of the United States. 54
The desire for space independence has led to
some European-level initiatives, such as
Galileo and the nascent SSA systems. And,
“Europe can no longer assume a fortuitous
coincidence of interest with the USA” and
needs to develop its own capabilities.
Moreover, the EU cannot be guaranteed
access to member state systems “in support of
possible or actual deployments of European
multinational units or coalition forces under
all circumstances.” 55 To support the range of
security functions it wants to carry out, the EU
increasingly feels it should have constant,
assured access to a variety of space assets.
The debate over European autonomy is related
to a deeper issue – the often differing attitudes
of the United States and Europe towards both
space policies and security policies. These
differences stem from U.S. and European
approaches to security after World War II.
While the United States policed Europe and
most of the world with military power, Europe
focused on economic integration and
development, and institution building.
Alluding to this tradition, an ESA working
group on Space and Human Security
maintained that “a European space policy
should encompass the European way of
approaching security problems.” 56 The
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European way consists of several principles:
effective multilateralism with an emphasis on
strengthening
the
international
order,
institutions, and rule of law; promoting a
stable international and regional environment
for Europe; and cooperation with partners,
both directly and through institutions. Thus,
Europe generally
prefers to use … the United
“soft power” in
States and Europe
international
politics – power must seek to
address the
combining
diplomacy,
problems that
cooperation, and might hamper
economic
and transatlantic
political action –
cooperation in
as opposed to
hard
military space and
power. Europe security, and
also tends to together take the
view
security lead on multilateral
rather broadly, approaches in this
encompassing
area.
issues, such as
economic
and
environmental security, in contrast with the
more traditional military approach, which has
often been taken by the United States. 57

homeland, safe by wielding this strength.
Accordingly, “U.S. space technology is
military oriented due to military strategy,
which is increasingly based on the concept of
information dominance, while European space
technology is more civilian oriented and dualuse.” 58 Similarly, the United States’ vision of
space is “increasingly dominated by military
priorities, while the EU emphasizes the use of
space technologies for disaster relief” and
other humanitarian missions outlined by the
Petersberg tasks, as well as civil security
interests. 59
Different transatlantic views of space and
security have led to disputes over various
initiatives, most notably the Galileo project.
The United States was concerned that EU
civilian control over the navigation system
might lead to security vulnerabilities. In
particular, defense officials worried that
potential adversaries could utilize Galileo’s
signals for attacks against U.S. and allied
forces. U.S. apprehensions were alleviated
when the EU established the GSA, which was
tasked with regulating Galileo and preventing
its unauthorized use.

Although the election of President Obama has
changed the tone of U.S. foreign policy to
include multilateral approaches, the United
States is the world’s superpower by all
measures, especially military might. The
United States also has a variety of
commitments overseas, many of which it must
fulfill unilaterally. Hence, the United States
outlook on security is from the perspective of
the world’s sole military superpower – it
keeps the international community, and its

Hesitance in Europe to militarize space at the
European, EU, or ESA levels has also led to
different transatlantic approaches toward
space and security. Proposals in France have
advocated ensuring the protection of national
capabilities and satellites, and continuing
work on SSA. Eventually, initial systems
would become more operational and more
European, but would stop short of developing
weapons to be used for space defense. 60 At the
same time, diplomatic efforts would ideally
establish rules of the road to prevent the
deployment of space weapons. Furthermore, at
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the New Defence Agenda conference, Jack
Metthey of the European Commission noted
that the EU focus is on security and not
defense – in the view of the European
Parliament, this rules out the possible
militarization of space and use of offensive
weapons. 61
While the United States has not displayed
support for a binding legal treaty banning all
space weapons, it has also shown self-restraint
in deploying them.
Concomitantly, the … the United
militarization
of
States and
space will continue
to accelerate in the Europe can set
United States. This the norms for
could
complicate future human
future joint efforts activity beyond
between the United Earth’s
States and Europe,
atmosphere to
at least at the
European level. As ensure the
stated earlier, the secure and
space
capabilities sustainable use
gap raises additional of space.
problems, leading
Sheldon to conclude that transatlantic space
cooperation will “probably be modest rather
than grandiose.” 62
Despite these challenges, space and security is
an area with potential for deeper transatlantic
collaboration. As mentioned earlier, U.S.
officials have shown interest in cooperating on
SSA. SSA is the first European space
initiative to be acknowledged as dual-use from
61
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the beginning, and officials are working to
determine how the military will use its
capabilities. While specific questions remain
as to how SSA will operate in Europe, an
effective multilayer system could serve as a
model for international cooperation leading to
a global network. Further, the EU’s draft Code
of Conduct is an innovative way to address the
issue of space weapons outside the CD and
would not impose any binding legal
restrictions on U.S. space activities.
In the past, Europe has developed institutions
to constrain the use of force and ensure
security. This tradition may lead the EU, along
with its member states and ESA, to promote
and develop multilateral initiatives for
improving space and security. Some
organizations and initiatives are already
underway. The Inter-Agency Space Debris
Coordination Committee (IADC), for
example, was launched in 1993 to address the
growing problem of space debris in Earth
orbits.
And,
the
International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) regulates
the radio-frequency spectrum and satellite
orbit resources to prevent harmful radio
interference between countries. Nonetheless,
there is still much room for international
collaboration for space governance. For
example, with an increasing number of actors
aspiring for and reaching space, traffic
management is a key potential area for
multilateral cooperation.
Xavier
Pasco
notes
that
technical
coordination, as well as rules of the road,
could eventually lead to some new space
regime, which may govern the security
dimensions of space. 63 The EU could be a
driver in this kind of development. Past
European initiatives, such as the OSCE, have
63
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University of Maryland, 2006), p. 41.

44

Michael Searway/European Approaches to Space and Security: Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation

focused on transparency, confidence-building,
and international cooperation to ensure
collective security, and will certainly inform
future designs. The Lisbon Treaty, once it is
fully implemented, could facilitate the EU’s
role as a leader in international space and
security cooperation. Indeed, the treaty was
developed for this kind of purpose. The
EEAS, in particular, was created to give the
EU more strength and coherence in
international affairs. Yet, battles over
jurisdiction within the EU, especially between
the EU institutions, must be resolved before
the EEAS can be effective. 64
Policy Recommendations
Despite the challenges that complicate
transatlantic space cooperation, the United
States and Europe continue to be natural
partners. They both face a number of complex
security threats today, which will require
international collaboration. Emerging security
concerns in space are no different. The unique
environmental attributes of space will
increasingly demand multilateral approaches.
Consequently, the United States and Europe
must seek to address the problems that might
hamper transatlantic cooperation in space and
security, and together take the lead on
multilateral approaches in this area.
A high-level dialogue on space issues could be
a useful step toward improved transatlantic
cooperation. Transatlantic dialogues already
exist on a range of other issues, and could
serve as a model for space discussions. In
2007, for example, the United States and the
EU created the Transatlantic Economic
64
If the EU can take the lead in this area, it should find a
willing partner on the other side of the Atlantic. Given that the
Obama Administration has expressed a preference for
multilateral approaches in international politics, Europeanled, multilateral initiatives in space and security could gain
traction in the United States.

Council (TEC) to oversee the dismantling of
transatlantic economic barriers. Key officials
from the United States’ administration and the
European Commission have been assigned to
head the TEC, giving it focus and executive
leadership. At the same time, exchanges have
taken place between lower level officials on
technical issues. An initiative like this for
space could have tangible benefits. Yet, due to
other concerns, like the ongoing financial
crisis, there might not be enough political
traction to launch such a dialogue at this time.
The lack of clear leadership on space issues, in
both the United States and Europe, presents
another challenge. In the United States, a
Senior Interagency Group for space within the
National Security Council would help address
this problem, and in the EU, a top adviser on
space issues could be created under the new
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy.
The United States and Europe must also
address issues of interoperability. For the EU,
ESA, and their member states, this will require
additional defense spending, especially for
space and security budgets. Funding in this
area in Europe will not be able to match the
United States, even at the European level.
Moreover, the euro zone crisis will make it
difficult to increase allocations in the shortterm. Nonetheless, there is much room for
improvement. The United States, in turn, must
continue to be more open and encouraging
towards European ambitions for space
independence. Security concerns, such as
those over Galileo, are legitimate, but need to
be addressed through direct, conventional
channels. Potential disagreements over space
systems between NATO and the CSDP can be
mitigated by determining when, where, and
how each actor will operate. Fortunately, the
Berlin plus agreement already models how
NATO and the EU can share assets for
security missions. This agreement should now
be modified, or a new agreement should be
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made, to determine how NATO and the EU
will
utilize
their
overlapping
and
complementary space systems.
Finally, the draft EU Code of Conduct should
be adopted by all spacefaring states in North
America and Europe. The Code should also be
extended to other major actors in space. This
approach, focusing on rules of the road instead
of binding treaties, is a practical way of
addressing the interests of all parties involved.
While it establishes principles of behavior that
the EU would like to see normalized, it does
not legally preclude the United States from
taking any actions in space that it feels are
necessary for security. Furthermore, the
United States and the EU should consider
what new multilateral space initiatives might
be feasible and desirable, such as one that
manages space traffic. Such endeavors could
lead to improved coordination and cooperation
in the future. Most importantly, they can
provide a framework for the United States and
the EU to work together in conjunction with
other
countries.
Broad
international
collaboration will be increasingly important as
states like China expand their space programs,
and the United States and EU will be able to
deal with these other actors more effectively
by coordinating their own efforts.
Conclusion
The development of alternative European and
transatlantic security structures after World
War II established and reinforced several
notions in Europe: a preference for institutions
for constraining the use of force, the benefits
of pooling resources, and the advantages of
international cooperation. On the other hand,
the history of European integration has also
shown the difficulty of merging national
defense structures. In space, Europe
cooperates to a great extent. While Europe is
increasingly developing dual-use systems for
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space and security, there continues to be great
sensitivity over militarizing space at the
European, EU, or ESA level. The European
approach to space, as well as a gap in
capabilities between the United States and
Europe, raises challenges for transatlantic
cooperation in space and security.
Nonetheless, space and security is an area
with
potential
for
U.S.-European
collaboration. What is more, some inventive
space and security projects are slowly taking
shape at the European level. If the EU can
fully implement the Lisbon Treaty and
increase its effectiveness in international
politics, it could become a leader in
multilateral initiatives in this area. The United
States could, and should, support this type of
role for Europe in space and security.
Together, the United States and Europe can
set the norms for future human activity
beyond Earth’s atmosphere to ensure the
secure and sustainable use of space.

India in Space:
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By launching its space probe to the Moon,
Chandrayaan-1, on 22 October 2008, India
joined the United States (U.S.), Japan, Europe,
Russia, and China in this accomplishment.
The principal goal of the probe was to conduct
mapping of the lunar surface, and among the
scientific payloads it carried two were from
the United States and three from the European
Space Agency (ESA). This was a unique
mission as it was an attempt to map highresolution, 3-D topography of entire Moon,
get mineral composition of surface, and
investigate the availability of water and
Helium-3. Chandrayaan-1 operated until
August 2009, coming to an abrupt end after
312 days, as opposed to the intended two
years. Despite the setback, Chandrayaan-1 did
achieve 95 percent of its planned objectives,
and made the significant discovery of water
ice molecules on the lunar surface. 1
Chandrayaan-1 is a historic milestone for the
Indian space program, aimed at laying the
1

See Chandrayaan, Lunar Mission by Indian Space Research
Organization, see http://www.chandrayaan-i.com/index.php/
chandrayaan-1.html (accessed April 2010). Chandrayan-1 was
placed into lunar orbit at an altitude of 100 kilometers.
Though it did not complete its two years in orbit, it provided a
large volume of data from its sensors, such as terrain mapping
camera, hyper-spectral imager, and moon mineralogy mapper.
The moon mineralogy mapper confirmed the existence of
water ice on the Moon, and analysis of the data acquired
detected more than 40 water ice-filled craters in the lunar
north pole.

groundwork for further space expeditions. It
was a landmark project for the Indian Space
Research Organization (ISRO), which had
launched dozens of satellites since its
founding in 1969, but had never before sent an
object beyond Earth’s orbit. The Indian
government has already approved the followon Chandrayaan-2 mission, a collaborative
venture with Russia. The data relayed by
Chandrayaan-1 about the nature of Moon’s
surface, will pave the way for the soft landing
of the rover that Chandrayaan-2 is scheduled
to take to the lunar surface.
For India, the lunar probe is yet another
testament to the progress it has made in the
last few years as an economic and
...India intends technological power.
The mission is a sign
to use space of India’s growing
for planetary strategic ambition,
research and and an indication of
for economic the importance it
to
space
purposes. gives
exploration.
The
superpowers had dominated space for much of
the space age, and now emerging powers, such
as China and India, are joining them. Space
accomplishments translate into greater
technological standing and strategic clout, as
well as an index of high-technology
capability. Moreover, space is an important
element of power projection and the lunar
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mission is part of an effort to assert Indian
prowess in space.
This paper examines the drivers of the Indian
space program. Factors at the structural,
domestic, and individual levels shaped the
trajectory of the Indian space program. Their
relative importance vis-à-vis each other
influence Indian aspirations in the realm of
space for both civil and military use.
Evolution of the Indian Space Program
The Indian space program started with
launching of sounding rockets in 1963. At that
time, the purpose was to focus on scientific
investigations of the upper atmospheric and
ionospheric
phenomena
above
the
geomagnetic equator. India’s first sounding
rocket was launched with the help of the
National
Aeronautics
and
Space
Administration (NASA), which provided a
Nike-Apache rocket along with other
hardware and training aids. It took more than a
decade’s time after this launch to put the first
Indian satellite in Earth orbit. Aryabhatta was
India’s first satellite, named after an Indian
mathematician of the 5th century of the
Common Era. It was launched with the help of
the former Soviet Union on 19 April 1975
from Kapustin Yar, a Russian rocket launch
and development site. 2 Since then, India
demonstrated that it could send an indigenous
satellite to orbit by using an indigenous
rocket. This was the launch of satellite, Rohini
1, with the Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV)
from its own launch site located at Sriharikota
on 18 July 1980.
India’s space program started under the aegis
of Department of Atomic Energy in 1962 with
2

The Soviet Union and India negotiated in August 1971 an
agreement, signed on 10 May 1972, in regard to a joint effort
to launch a satellite.

creation of Indian National Committee for
Space Research (INCOSPAR). The mandate
to the committee was to oversee all aspects of
space research in the country. Work began on
the establishment of the Thumba Equatorial
Rocket Launching Station (TERLS) in 1962.
India’s former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
dedicated TERLS to the United Nations (UN)
on 2 February 1968. On that occasion,
INCOSPAR Chairman, Vikram Sarabhai,
articulated India’s goal in space. He stated that
India’s program is civilian, with a focus on the
application of space technology as a tool for
socioeconomic development of the country.
The basic aim of India’s space program was
described as a program capable of using space
technologies in the vital areas of development,
such as communications, meteorology, and
natural resource management. 3
ISRO was formed under the Department of
Atomic Energy in 1969, and was subsequently
brought under the Department of Space in
1972. A Space Commission was also
established in 1972, which reports directly to
the Prime Minister. The Department of Space
along with ISRO operates four independent
projects: (1) the Indian National Satellite
Space Segment Project; (2) the National
Natural Resource Management System
(NNRMS); (3) the National Remote Sensing
Agency (NRSA); and (4) the Physical
Research Laboratory (PRL). The Department
of Space sponsors research in various
academic and research institutions under a
program called RESPOND, the sponsored
research. This program allows ISRO to
interact with various educational institutes and
outsource research efforts. 4
3
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(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp.1-2.
4
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Presently, ISRO has various operating
divisions throughout the country. These
divisions deal with space systems, propulsion,
communications, telemetry and tracking,
research, space launch, and other facets of the
space program. The major achievements of the
space program have been in the area of the
domestic design, production, and launching of
remote sensing and communications satellites.
Over the years, ISRO established a strong
infrastructure for remote sensing and
communications satellite systems with
launcher autonomy. In 1992, ISRO established
its commercial outlet, the Antrix Corporation. 5
This organization markets space and
telecommunications products of ISRO.
Initially, the Indian space program focused on
experimental, low-capability projects that
allowed Indian scientists to gain experience in
the construction and operation of satellites and
launch vehicles. ISRO built the Bhaskara
Earth observation satellites, a communication
satellite, the APPLE
satellite,
and Indian armed
conducted four test forces
flights of the SLV- understand the
III satellite launch relevance of
vehicle
between space
1979 and 1983. 6 The
technologies to
Bhaskara satellites
st
were launched with address 21
help from the former century
Soviet Union. Even security
though only two of threats.
the four test flights
of SLV were successful, this program was
followed by a more advanced program, the
Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV).
From the mid-1980s, India focused on more
capable, mission specific systems. ISRO
5

Antrix is a Sanskrit word meaning Space.
Dinshaw Mistry, “India’s Emerging Space Program”, Pacific
Affairs 71:2 (Summer, 1998): 153.

6
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started designing and developing the Polar
Orbiting Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV),
and its successor, the Geosynchronous
Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV). These
launch vehicles were required to launch the
indigenously developed Indian Remote
Sensing (IRS) satellite, and a meteorology and
telecommunications Indian National Satellite
(INSAT). PSLV commenced its operational
launches in 1997, and since then, it has been a
reliable launch vehicle with ten consecutive
successful flights through April 2007. 7 On 2
September 2007, India successfully launched
an INSAT geostationary satellite with the
GSLV. This launch proved India’s capabilities
to put satellites weighing 2,500 kilograms (kg)
into geostationary Earth orbit (GEO). The first
two stages of GSLV I and II are derived from
PSLV.
ISRO is developing as well a more advanced
GSLV version, GSLV III, which is an entirely
new launch vehicle that is not derived from
PSLV or previous GSLVs. In April 2002, the
Indian government approved $520 million
U.S. dollars for development of GSLV III
with the capability to launch 4,500 kg satellite
to geo-synchronous transfer orbit (GTO) with
growth potential towards 5,000 kg payload
capability. 8 However, ISRO’s GSLV program
suffered a setback in April 2010 with the
failure of GSLV D3. This launch vehicle was
carrying a communication satellite called
GSAT-4 with a mass of 2,220 kg. The main
feature of this mission was the employment of
the first Indian made cryogenic engine. The
failure of the cryogenic engine underlined that
India will have to wait for a number of years
to realize its dream of sending 5,000 kg of
various satellites to space. 9
7

Ibid. Also, see “ISRO Does an Italian Job,” Hindustan
Times, 23 April 2007.
8
See
ISRO,
http://www.isro.org/Launchvehicles/
GSLVMARKIII/mark3.aspx (accessed April 2010).
9
“India’s ambitious quest to achieve total independence in
cryogenic technology for launching satellite launch vehicles
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The Indian space program has followed the
path in space envisaged by Sarabhai in the
1970s of socioeconomic applications for the
country. Investments have revolved around
remote sensing and multi-purpose application
satellites, and related launching technologies.
Yet today, India is looking beyond Sarabhai’s
vision of harnessing space just for economic
and social development. India’s lunar probe,
Chandrayaan, and ISRO’s proposal to
undertake human lunar missions are examples
of how India seeks to expand upon its national
space endeavors. 10 Of note, is that during the
1970s, Sarabhai argued that India does not
have the fantasy of competing with the
economically advanced nations in the
exploration of the Moon, the planets, or to
engage in human spaceflight.

cost of around $100 million U.S. dollars. 11
ISRO is planning to put its first Indian
astronaut into orbit by 2014-2016, depending
on whether the government approves ISRO’s
budget needed for this effort (see Table 1
below).

In addition to Chandrayaan, India has
formulated a road map to send a human
mission to the Moon by 2020. This added
dimension of undertaking human space
missions needs to be viewed not as a policy
shift per say, but as a natural progression in
developing space capabilities. India also plans
to send satellites to study Mars. With the
successful
launch
and
mission
of
Chandrayaan, India, for the first time, has
entered into an arena of deep space
exploration. ISRO managed to keep the cost
factor very low for this effort. It looks certain
that this mission is not a “one-off mission,”
and Indian investments in this area are likely
to increase in the near future. As stated earlier,
the Indian government approved a second
robotic lunar mission, Chandrayaan-2, at a
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suffered a setback with the indigenous cryogenic engine in a
Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV-D3) failing
to ignite and the vehicle tumbling into the sea.” See The
Hindu, 15 April 2010, http://beta.thehindu.com/news/
national/article398070.ece?homepage=true (accessed April
2010).
10
K.S. Jayaraman, “India’s Space Agency Proposes Manned
Spaceflight Programme,” Space News, 10 November 2006.

At the end of the first decade of the 21st
century, India’s satellite program is headed
towards following a multi-pronged strategy. In
addition to social causes, India intends to use
space for planetary research and for economic
purposes. To conduct all these activities, focus
areas for Indian space efforts include: remote
sensing,
meteorology,
communication,
education, navigation, and astronomy and
planetary missions.

Sarabhai had articulated in the early 1970s
that India’s space program is civilian in
nature. Also, the development of the Indian
civil space program was not born out of
military programs, like ballistic missile
programs. Rather, civil space efforts focused
on satellite development and establishing
satellite launch capabilities for civil
purposes. 12
However,
satellite
technology,
being
inherently dual-use in nature, has applicability
for military purposes. For example, a one
meter (m) resolution Technology Experiment
Satellite (TES) was launched by ISRO in
2001. It was stated by the then ISRO
Chairman, K. Kasturirangan, that the satellite
was meant for “civilian use consistent with
11

P. Sunderrajan, “Cabinet clears Chandrayaan-2,” The Hindu,
19 September 2008.
12
For an overview of recent trends in Indian Missile
Capability, see Harsh V. Pant and Bharath Gopalaswami,
“India’s Emerging Missile Capability: The Science and
Politics of Agni-III,” Comparative Strategy 27:4 (AugustSeptember 2008): 376-387.
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our security concerns.” 13 Such high resolution
imagery has obvious military utility. In the
recent past, India also launched Cartosat 1,
Cartosat 2, and Cartosat 2A high resolution
satellites with 2.5 m, 1 m, and 0.8 m
resolutions respectively. These satellites are
for cartographic purposes, as well as for urban
and rural development. Such satellites offer
India the capability of intelligence-gathering,
keeping an “eye on the region surrounding the
country.
Geographically, India’s location at the base of
continental Asia astride the Indian Ocean
places it at a vantage point in relation to
maritime trade. India has a strong stake in the
security and stability of these waters since a
large percent of Asian oil and gas supplies is
shipped through the Indian Ocean. 14 Presently,
the security of such supplies depends on
multilateral initiatives that have been
sanctioned by the UN. Indian navy and costguard play a role within the ambit of the UN
Law of the Sea Convention. The use of space
could clearly help India in this role.
Indian armed forces understand the relevance
of space technologies to address 21st century
security threats. The Indian Air Force (IAF) is
planning to integrate space-based applications
into conventional strategies and operations.
The IAF is already using space for
telecommunications,
reconnaissance,
navigation, targeting, and other operations.
The IAF is adopting a focused and fasttracked approach to harness space effectively
to provide synergy with all facets of its

13

See Joe Katzman, “India’s Emerging Military Satellite
System,” 10 August 2005, http://www.windsofchange.net/
archives/007318.php (accessed April 2010).
14
From the lecture delivered by Shri M.M. Pallaum Raju,
Minister of State for Defence, Government of India. See “P.C.
Lal Memorial Lecture,” organized by the Air Force
Association, 19 March 2007, New Delhi, India.
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operational roles. 15 For the last few years, the
IAF has been advocating and preparing for the
establishment of a tri-service aerospace
command to protect both the territorial and
space assets of India. Today, India
understands that many modern day defense
options rely heavily on space-based sensors,
and for better coordination and timely
dissemination of surveillance, reconnaissance,
and tracking information. 16
India has no policy towards weaponization of
space, yet Indian armed forces require the
assistance of the space assets to undertake
various operations, in air, land, and sea.
Keeping in view such military space
requirements, particularly with the backdrop
of the anti-satellite test conducted by China
during January 2007, India has established a
“Space Cell” under the command of the
Integrated
Defence
Services
(IDS)
Headquarters. IDS acts as a single
organization for integration among the armed
forces, the Department of Space, and ISRO.
India maintains that such a body is required
due to “offensive counter space systems and
an improved array of military space systems
emerging in India’s neighborhood.” 17
Drivers of Indian Space Program
Following below is a discussion of the main
drivers that have influenced the trajectory of
India’s space program. They can be broadly
15

D.C. Kumaria, “Leveraging Space Capabilities for India’s
Defence”, Air Power Journal 1:2 (October-December 2006):
86-87.
16
From the lecture delivered by Shri M.M. Pallaum Raju,
Minister of State for Defence, Government of India. See “P.C.
Lal Memorial Lecture,” organized by the Air Force
Association, 19 March 2007, New Delhi, India.
17
See “Now, space cell to keep an eye on China’s plans,” The
Times of India, 11June 2008, http://timesofindia.
indiatimes.com/India/File_Now_space_cell_to_keep_an_eye_
on_Chinas_plans/articleshow/3118491.cms (accessed April
2010).
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examined under three levels: (1) structural, (2)
domestic, and (3) individual. At the structural
level, the changing global balance of power
and growing competition among spacefaring
states is analyzed’ at the domestic level, the
economic and political factors, as well as the
technological development and bureaucratic
momentum shaping Indian space policy, are
examined; and at the individual level, the role
of key personalities in shaping the Indian
space priorities is assessed.

International Structural Factors
With the recent rise in India’s economic and
political power, India is more ambitious in
defining its priorities in space than it has ever
been in the past. India’s space policy is
responding not only to India’s own attempt at
emerging as a major global actor, but also to
the space efforts of other powers. With other
powers, such as China and Japan, deciding to
explore the lunar surface with humans, India
has also joined the “bandwagon.” India has a
technologically sophisticated space program,
which is now addressing the challenges of
human spaceflight and exploration. Towards
this end, India is cooperating with a number of
states and U.S.-Indian space cooperation is
beginning to grow substantially.
India has only recently started the military
dimension of its space program, and as the
space race among major powers gains
momentum, it will become pivotal for Indian
military planners. With China viewing conflict
in space as an integrated part of military
operations, India is gradually coming to terms
with the possibility of the weaponization of
space. 18 For long, the Indian government has

resisted the demand of its military to establish
an aerospace command by arguing that it did
not want to trigger greater militarization of
space or the possibility of arms race in space
among regional powers. But gradually, India
is realizing that whether it likes it or not, the
military use of space is pervasive among
world powers, and there is little India can do
to stop it. Also, by supporting the already
deployed U.S. missile defense system, India
seems to have casted its vote towards the
militarization, and perhaps weaponization, of
space with the missile defense system being a
first step towards an anti-satellite capability.
India has a two-tiered missile defense system,
the Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) missile for
high altitude interception, and the Advanced
Air Defence (AAD)
India’s space Missile for lower
policy is altitude interception.
responding not Several successful
tests for this system
only to India’s have already been
own attempt at conducted, and these
emerging as a systems will become
major global operational in two to
actor, but also three years. Also,
to the space according to the
Defence Research
efforts of other and Development
powers. Organisation, Indian
defense
scientists
are readying a weapons system to neutralize
enemy satellites operating in low-Earth orbit
(LEO).
It was the Chinese test of an anti-satellite
weapon (ASAT) in 2007 that led the Indian
establishment to take more seriously the
military uses of space. China successfully
used a ground-based missile to hit and destroy

18

For a detailed account of writings discussing China’s views
of war in space as an integrated part of military operations,
see Kevin Pollpeter, “The Chinese Vision of Space Military
Operations” in China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs:
Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese

People’s Liberation Army, James Mulvenon and David M.
Finkelstein, eds. (CNA Corporation, December 2005).
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one of its weather satellites. In effect, China
demonstrated an effective ASAT capability
comparable to the United States technology
from the mid 1980s and Russian systems from
about the same time. The test reinforced
China’s status as a military space power; equal
to the United States and Russia, but more
significantly key U.S. space systems are now
at risk in any future conflict with China. 19
As a consequence, suggestions are now being
made that the United States should start
investing
in
offensive
counter-space
capabilities. 20
The
Bush Administration It was the
tacitly asserted the Chinese test of
United States right to an anti-satellite
space weapons and weapon in
has continued to
2007 that led
oppose
the
emergence of treaties the Indian
or other measures establishment
restricting them. For to take more
the United States, seriously the
any arms control military uses of
regime in outer space
space.
would constrain its
military options, and it wants to retain its
military operational flexibility.
In early 2008, the United States Navy’s
missile interceptor successfully struck a dying
spy satellite of the United States in LEO over
the Pacific Ocean. With this missile strike, the
United States categorically signaled that its
missile defenses can be used to counter
strategic ASATs. An interceptor designed for
missile defense was used for the first time to
attack a satellite, and as such, showcased how
the emerging missile defense arsenal could be
reprogrammed to counter an unexpected
19

Ashley Tellis, “Punching the U. S. Military's "Soft Ribs":
China's Anti-satellite Weapon Test in Strategic Perspective,”
Carnegie Endowment, Policy Brief 51, June 2007.
20
Ashley Tellis, “China’s Military Space Strategy,” Survival
(Autumn 2007): 41-72.
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threat, which in this case was deadly rocket
fuel aboard a dead satellite. This will no doubt
strengthen the hands of the supporters of the
missile defense system in which the United
States has already made significant
investments. This test was as a major success
for the United States Missile Defense Agency,
in so far as it amounted to an unprecedented
use of components of the military’s missile
defense system designed to shoot down hostile
ballistic missiles in flight, not satellites.
It is instructive that this strike by the United
States came days after China and Russia
proposed a global treaty banning weapons in
space in the UN Conference on Disarmament,
as well as rising Russian opposition to the
United States placement of missile defense
interceptors in Eastern Europe. The United
States has opposed this treaty effort arguing
that the proposed draft is largely directed at
U.S. military technology, as it allows China
and Russia to fire ground-based missiles into
space or use satellites as weapons. There is
also reluctance on the part of China and
Russia on clearly defining a space weapon as
they too want to keep their options flexible.
The Europeans are presenting their own
challenge to U.S. supremacy in space. The
first satellite in the European Union’s (EU’s)
Galileo satellite navigation program was
launched in 2005 rivaling the United States
Global Positioning System (GPS). The Galileo
project is a $4 billion U.S. dollar enterprise
whereupon Europe hopes to end its reliance on
the GPS system. Apart from demonstrating
Europe’s technological prowess, Galileo’s
launch also signaled European desire to
enhance its own space capabilities, rather than
depend on the United States. Not surprisingly,
the United States military had been extremely
critical of Galileo, calling it unnecessary and a
potential security threat during wartime as its
signals might interfere with next-generation
GPS signals intended for use by the United
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States military. Though this dispute was later
resolved when the EU and the United States
agreed to make Galileo compatible with GPS,
it underlined the unease with which the United
States views any attempt to challenge its
supremacy in space.
American plans to militarize space have come
into sharp relief in recent years. In 2004, the
United States Air Force issued a Counter
Space Operations document that discussed
both defensive and offensive counter space
operations. 21 Prior to this, in the 1996 Clinton
Administration’s National Space Policy for
example, a more pacific use of space was
emphasized, including satellite support for
military operations, arms control, and nonproliferation
pacts.
Regardless,
space
capabilities provide vital support to American
power projection. The United States military
has invested enormous sums in the research,
development, and procurement of satellites for
intelligence-gathering, communications, and
navigation, and that investment is widely
regarded to great benefits for U.S.
warfighting.
The unilateral withdrawal of the United States
from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
in 2002 and its pursuit of an open-ended
ballistic missile defense program already point
towards future U.S. plans to address the
challenges of space as a new battlefield. In
fact, a commission headed by the former U.S.
Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, had
recommended in 2001 that the military should
“ensure that the President will have the option
to deploy weapons in space.” 22 It is towards
this end that the Pentagon launched the XSS21

Counter Space Operations, Air Force Doctrine Document
2-2.1, 2 August 2004, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/
service_pubs/afdd2_2_1.pdf (accessed April 2010).
22
The report of the Rumsfeld Commission to Assess the
Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States,
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/rumsfeld/toc.htm
(accessed April 2010).

11 orbital micro-satellite, which is designed to
disturb other states’ military reconnaissance
and communication satellites.
Despite
financial,
technological,
and
diplomatic hurdles, U.S. efforts to gain space
superiority will continue, and the rest of the
world will have to find ways and means to
respond to this challenge. It is in this broader
global context that India, as a major space
power, is trying to re-define its priorities in
space.
Since inception of its space program, India has
been supported by the United States, erstwhile
Russia and the European countries, in various
areas, from providing launching facilities, to
helping with technology transfer, and to
sending astronauts to space. At the same time,
the United States imposed sanctions on the
Indian space program from 1987 to 2004
because of subsequent change in U.S. policies
due to India’s nuclear and missile posture.23
Since 2004, the Indian space program is
receiving support from all major space
powers. The United States is likely to play the
23
The United States and India began space cooperation in the
1960s with sounding rockets, which expanded to transfer of
technology for launch vehicle development and sharing of
satellite data. However, concerns about the global
proliferation of ballistic missiles led the United States to
establish the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in
1987 to coordinate national export licensing measures on
missiles and related technology, including technology for
space launch vehicles that might contribute to the
development of military systems. MTCR targeted emerging
missile programs, including those of India, and led to
restrictions on U.S. technology transfers to India’s space
launch vehicle programs. In 1992, U.S.-India space relations
further deteriorated when the United States objected to an
agreement between the Russia and India for the sale to India
of cryogenic rocket engines and the technology to produce
them. In 1998, the Indian nuclear tests led the Clinton
Administration to impose sanctions, restrictive export
licensing requirements, on ISRO and other Indian entities
involved in space and missile programs. Since January 2004,
U.S.-India space cooperation was re-established to facilitate
greater commercial space cooperation, and cooperation in
space exploration and the launching of satellites.
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policy of using India to balance China in the
region, and India is likely to exploit the
situation. 24 Already, India has collaborated
with the United States for its first Moon
mission, and the Manmohan Singh-Bush joint
statement agreement of 18 July 2005 indicates
that in the arena of space India-U.S.
collaborations are likely to strengthen. 25
India’s has worked and is working with
various members of ESA on a host of space
issues. India is also engaging Russia on
various space ventures, and the joint
collaboration reached by both states on
Chandrayaan-2 is a case in point. India is not
collaborating with China in space; however,
China has given certain encouraging signals to
India towards collaboration. Wu Ji, identified
as Director of the Center for Space Science
and Applied Research, Chinese Academy of
Sciences, mentioned the possibility of space
cooperation during his visit to India in 2006,
while accompanying Chinese President Hu
Jintao. 26 Today, both states understand that
collaboration could allow them to take
advantage of existing capacity on both sides.
Given the rivalry that animates Sino-Indian
ties, and absent any near-term cooperation,
India intends to match Chinese advances in
space.

24

On the changing regional balance of power in the AsiaPacific, see Harsh V. Pant, “The Emerging Balance of Power
in the Asia-Pacific,” The Royal United Services Institute
Journal 152:3 (June 2007).
25
See Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, 18 July 2005,
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/
2005/07/20050718-6.html (accessed April 2010). For hightechnology and space, it was declared that the two countries
will: provide for joint research and training; build closer ties
in space exploration, satellite navigation, and launch, and in
the commercial space arena through mechanisms, such as the
United States-India Working Group on Civil Space
Cooperation; and build on the strengthened nonproliferation
commitments between the two states to remove Indian
organizations from export control restrictions.
26
Bruce Einhorn, “Chindia - Cooperation in the Space Race?”
Business Week, 21 November 2006.
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Domestic Factors
ISRO has not faced problems in securing
resources, and has tended to receive steady
governmental support. This is one area where
a “bottom-up” approach has been found in
regard to the growth of the space program. It
is ISRO that normally decides what projects to
undertake and how to proceed. The
government has so far been supportive of most
of ISRO’s plans. The value of ISRO’s overall
assets today is approximately $25 billion U.S.
dollars. 27 ISRO spends 85 percent of its $1
billion U.S. dollar annual budget on
development-related missions, and the
remaining 15 percent on advanced research
and development (R&D), and on missions,
such as Chandrayaan. Table 1 highlights the
distribution of funds.
Table 1. Distribution of Funds for the Indian Space Program.
Source: ISRO, http://www.isro.org (accessed April 2010).
Rupees in Crores [one Indian Rupee in Crores equals
$0.224 million U.S. dollars as of April 2010].
ACTUALS
2006-2007

REVISED
ESTIMATES
2007-2008

BUDGET
ESTIMATES
2008-2009

Space
Technology

1668.37

2017.00

2611.52

Space
Applications

284.46

299.77

375.28

Space
Sciences

228.36

321.60

268.37

INSAT,
Operational

376.77

573.57

404.81

Administration
Total

430.70

78.15

414.09

2988.66

3290.09

4074.07

A major limitation, which India’s space
program is likely to face, is the availability of
a trained workforce. This becomes evident
from the fact that many young scientists
recruited by ISRO are leaving jobs because of
the much higher remuneration offered by
27
K. Kasturirangan, “The Emerging World Space Order” in
Space Security and Global Cooperation, Ajey Lele and
Gunjan Singh, eds. (Academic Foundation: New Delhi, India
2009), p. 33.
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private companies. ISRO is not able to attract
the best people from the Indian universities,
and in the year 2006, more than 50 percent of
newly inducted scientists left ISRO. 28 Also, a
major part of the existing aging workforce is
likely to retire in years to come. ISRO expects
to address this shortfall by outsourcing
research and undertaking major recruitment
drives to replenish the workforce. In order to
find a long-term solution to this problem,
ISRO has established an institute at
Thiruvanandapuram, India for workforce
training. However, these efforts will not
address workforce issues completely. This is
mainly because many India students are
attracted to Information Technology as a
profession for more than a decade, and the
trend is likely to continue. Rocket scientists
have limited options of joining government
jobs, which do not offer attractive pay salaries.
Apart from human resources, ISRO is not
expected to face any major resources
problems, like non-availability of materials
required for hardware production. 29 Though at
present, India is not capable of integrated
circuitry manufacturing. Yet, it is expected
that India will overcome this deficiency,
which in turn will benefit the space sector.

Political Changes
Since independence, India’s science and
technology policies have more or less
remained unchanged irrespective of the
political ideology of the government in power.
It needs to be emphasized that actually it is not
the political party, but the political leadership
that plays a significant role towards giving
28
In 2006, ISRO hired 354 new scientists, but 187 trained
ones left the organization by 2007. See “ISRO bleeds as
scientists leave,” The Times of India, 6 September 2007,
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/ISRO_bleeds_as_sci
entists_leave/articleshow/2341361.cms (accessed April 2010).
29
Personal correspondence with ISRO scientists.

support to new technologies. The history of
various political parties in power shows that
the programs of national importance, which
have security implications, do not get
entangled in party politics. India’s nuclear test
in 1998, Pokhran II, exemplifies this.
For the Indian space program, scientists and
ISRO officials have largely shaped the
trajectory and have been able to muster the
requisite support from the government. The
benefits of India’s space program are well
demonstrated, and in view of this, it is
unlikely that any
ISRO has not major changes would
faced take place in policies
problems in and budgetary support
securing depending on the
resources, political party in
power.
However,
and has some degree of
tended to dependence on the
receive steady United States still
governmental exists and is likely to
support. exist, and as such, the
emergence of political
tensions between India and the United States
would have an effect on the Indian space
program. 30
Other political issues facing the national space
program
include
bureaucratic
and
programmatic factors. Successes in the space
sector tend to be short-lived, and at times,
failures are more highlighted. ISRO’s recent
failure in regard to its commercial venture, the
W2M satellite, could have some negative
impact on its international reputation when it
was trying to develop a niche for itself in the
communications satellite field. Any more
failures could bring in the bureaucratic
cautiousness in this area.
30

It has not been clearly articulated by ISRO for obvious
reasons; however, personal correspondence with ISRO
scientists second this concern.
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India’s space program is placed directly under
the Prime Minister, and thus, is relatively free
of bureaucratic delays despite programmatic
issues that may
arise. A broad look A major
at the development
limitation, which
of science and
technology within India’s space
the country in program is
general, and the likely to face, is
programs of major the availability
technological
of a trained
organizations, like
workforce.
Defence Research
and Development
Organisation (DRDO) and ISRO, during last
decade shows that political, bureaucratic, and
financial support for projects are not
problems.
This observation is further reinforced by the
facts that the technocrat community within
India has established itself, and ISRO is a
success story, which has brought prestige and
foreign exchange to the country. Also, given
indigenous capabilities for satellite and launch
vehicle development, ISRO is unlikely to
acquire any large-scale technology from other
states, and hence, bureaucratic constraints,
which usually exist in regard to technology
transfer, are not an issue at play.
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These technological factors could be viewed
at two levels: indigenous development and
transfer of technology. After the success of the
India-U.S. nuclear deal, it is unlikely that
transfer of technology could become a major
issue in years to come. 31 Apart from the
United States, India is expected to have good
relations in space with states like France,
United Kingdom, Israel, and Russia. Current
trends indicate that India’s future programs
could constitute various joint projects, either
at bilateral or multilateral levels. Many
spacefaring nations are likely to prefer joint
projects in years to come because of the cost
factor and gestation period required for
indigenous development of technology. On
the other hand, technologies, which could
have direct or indirect military relevance, are
not shared in cooperative programs and
projects. Such technologies would demand
indigenous development.

Individual Level Factors
Science and technology leadership in India is
driven by various key individuals. Vasant
Sathe played a key role during the 1980s to
bring color television to India; Rajiv Gandhi
was instrumental for the information
technology revolution; and Sam Pitrotoda for
the revolution in communications. More
specific to space, Homi Bhaba, Vikaram

Technological Factors
31

Within next 20 years, technologies, like
biotechnology, nanotechnology, and robotics
and cognitive technology, are expected to
revolutionalize the space sector. These
technologies are expected to bring light
weight materials to the space sector, which
will largely impact the structural design of
satellites and components. In addition,
computing capabilities will increase in years
to come, and power sources will be carrying
more capacity with reduced mass.

The United States Congress, on 1 October 2008, gave final
approval to an agreement facilitating nuclear cooperation
between the United States and India. The deal is seen as a
watershed in U.S.-India relations and introduces a new aspect
to international nonproliferation efforts. First introduced in
the joint statement released by President Bush and Indian
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on 18 July 2005, the deal
lifts a three-decade U.S. moratorium on nuclear trade with
India. It provides U.S. assistance to India’s civilian nuclear
energy program, and expands U.S.-India cooperation in
energy and satellite technology. For details on US-India
civilian nuclear energy cooperation agreement, see Harsh V.
Pant, “The US-India Nuclear Pact: Policy, Process and Great
Power Politics,” Asian Security 5:3 (September 2009):273295.
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Sahrabhai,
APJ
Abdul
Kalam,
K.
Kasturirangan, and Madhavan Nair played key
roles towards providing science and
technology leadership.
Bhaba is regarded as a visionary in the field of
science in modern India. He did pioneering
work towards peaceful development of atomic
energy. Bhabha established the Atomic
Energy Commission of India in 1948. His
other areas of
interest include ...the Indian space
research
on program is civilian
cosmic
rays in nature, and India
and quantum is yet to articulate a
theory. Apart
strategic approach.
from being a
scientist,
he This will make it
was an able difficult to reconcile
civilian and military
administrator
and played a priorities in space.
significant role
towards developing a world class automatic
energy research center in India. Bhaba was
succeeded in 1966 by Vikram Sarabhai as the
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.
Known as father of Indian space program,
Sarabhai was the first Chairman of
INCOSPAR, which was created after Sputnik
was launched into the space in 1957. Sarabhai
established the first launching site in the
country, TERLS.
India’s 11th President, A.P.J. Abdul Kalam,
who assumed office on 25 July 2002, is a
scientist. Before assuming the office of the
President, he had held various scientific
positions, and is often referred to as the
“Missile Man of India” – he was the Project
Director of India’s first indigenous SLV. He
has a unique distinction of working both on
India’s missile program and on India’s
satellite program. Kalam also spearheaded the
campaign of motivating children and young
scientists to involve themselves in undertaking
various scientific challenges. In many ways,

Kalam succeeded in motivating an entire
generation to look constructively towards
issues of science and technology.
Kasturirangan, presently a Member of
Parliament, steered India’s space program for
over nine years as Chairman of ISRO. He led
various
space
programs
successfully,
including PSLV and in conceiving India’s
Moon
mission.
Kasturirangan
largely
succeeded in placing India as a preeminent
spacefaring nation. His successor, who
recently retired, Madhavan Nair, played a
significant role in developing ISRO’s future
roadmap with plans for deep space missions
and proposals to put an Indian on the Moon
within a decade’s time.
Conclusions
India’s lunar mission is a statement of the
nation becoming more ambitious in defining
its priorities in space, and in the coming years,
the civilian aspects of the Indian space
program can be expected to gather further
momentum. The military aspects will also get
greater attention of the government, in light of
competition among spacefaring nations. Also,
greater cooperation in space will emerge with
the United States, Europe, and Japan, though
with respect to China, the relationship will
remain inherently competitive.
India’s efforts in space will continue to be
hampered by an absence of a coherent national
space policy. This is the case because the
Indian space program is civilian in nature, and
India is yet to articulate a strategic approach.
This will make it difficult to reconcile civilian
and military priorities in space. The current
roadmap of ISRO demonstrates firm resolve
to move in a particular direction, yet India is
taking only tentative steps in so far as the
military dimension of its space policy is
concerned.
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Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, the “father of space
travel” wrote in 1911: “Earth is the cradle of
humanity, but humanity cannot stay in the
cradle forever.” The world is on the threshold
of a new age of space exploration, as well as
militarization of space, and possible
weaponization of space. India, with its
achievements in its own space program, is in a
unique position to be a major player in the
drama of space. The trajectory of India’s
space efforts demonstrate that India is getting
ready to use its space capabilities for not just
expanded civil and commercial use, but also
for force multiplication and power projection.
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“Astronaut Envy?”
The U.S. Military’s Quest for a Human Mission in Space
Roger D. Launius
National Air and Space Museum

Before the beginning of the space age in 1957,
the Department of Defense (DOD) of the
United States sought to gain the mission and
the technologies to carry out human
operations in space. Even after 1958, when
President Dwight D. Eisenhower made the
decision to assign the human spaceflight
mission to the newly created National
Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), DOD champions continued to argue
for a role for military astronauts. The military
pursued several flight projects in the 1960s,
achieved flight status for military astronauts
on classified missions on the Space Shuttle in
the 1980s, and has continued to advocate a
human military mission in space as the
twentieth century came to an end. All this
happened despite an exceptionally weak
rationale for military astronauts in space.
While the DOD commitment to human
spaceflight has moderated in the post-cold war
era, there remains some who seek this activity
as a military mission. This essay reviews the
history of the military quest for human
spaceflight, and suggests that a human
military presence in space will come as other
humans settle beyond Earth as has long been
the case in terrestrial exploration and
settlement. It points to the continuing
difficulty of developing a rationale for human
spaceflight, a difficulty that has come to a
head in the early twenty-first century as the
Space Shuttle is retired and plans for future
vehicles remain unclear.
When the administration of President Barak
Obama took office in January 2009, American
human spaceflight efforts were at a

crossroads. In the aftermath of the Columbia
accident on 1 February 2004, the Bush
administration had taken the decision that the
venerable Space Shuttle, flown since 1981,
had grown unsafe and needed replacement. It
set 2010 as the date of shuttle retirement and
directed NASA to pursue a follow-on
technology. This would help create
technologies necessary to return to the Moon
and eventually travel to Mars. 1
The result was the Constellation program
established in 2005 as an effort to use
modified Space Shuttle hardware to go
beyond Earth orbit, with the Moon as a target.
By 2009, however, it had become highly
uncertain whether that goal could be realized.
The new administration realized that the
Constellation program had run into
technological and budgetary problems and
took action to end it in February 2010. 2
In this context, the way forward for NASA’s
human spaceflight efforts remains unclear.
Moreover, the American military’s periodic
enchantment with human spaceflight vehicles
1

Frank Sietzen Jr. and Keith L. Cowing, New Moon Rising:
The Making of the Bush Space Vision (Apogee Books, 2004);
Craig Cornelius, “Science in the National Vision for Space
Exploration: Objectives and Constituencies of the ‘DiscoveryDriven’ Paradigm,” Space Policy 21 (February 2005): 41-48;
Wendell Mendell, “The Vision for Human Spaceflight,”
Space Policy 21 (February 2005): 7-10; and Thor Hogan,
Mars Wars: The Rise and Fall of the Space Exploration
Initiative (Washington, DC: NASA SP-2007-4410, 2007).
2
Office of Science and Technology Policy/National
Aeronautics and Space Administration Fact Sheet, “A Bold
New Approach for Space Exploration and Discovery,” 1
February 2010, copy in possession of author.
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remains unsettled. The Air Force has proposed
in the past that it pursue its own human
spacecraft; and some on the fringe believe that
it already has a capability that is unknown to
the general public. 3 How has the United States
military viewed the human spaceflight mission
since the origins of the space and its role in it?
Has this changed over time and why? What
possibilities for the future might exist for a
human military presence in space?
Origins of the Military
Human Spaceflight Effort
Well before the beginning of the space age,
the DOD had angled for the mission of
placing humans in space for tasks ranging
from
space-based
reconnaissance,
to
navigation, to communications, and to early
warning. Over time, especially as it has
become increasingly obvious that the national
security mission is effectively conducted by
robotic spacecraft, it has come to be called,
rather crassly, “astronaut envy.” Thus, in the
early 1950s, Wernher von Braun, working for
the Army Ballistic Missile Agency in
Huntsville, Alabama, proposed a massive
space station with more than fifty military
personnel aboard to undertake Earth
observation for reconnaissance and as an
orbiting battle station. Von Braun believed
this could be used for nuclear missile strikes
against the Soviet Union. 4 He could not get

anyone in authority in the Eisenhower
administration to adopt his plan, though some
senior officials in the DOD did see a role for
military astronauts.
After a series of studies and high level
deliberations, in 1957 the United States Air
Force (USAF) proposed the development of a
piloted orbital proposal designated “Man-inSpace Soonest” (MISS). 5 Initially dismissed
before the launch of Sputnik, afterwards Air
Force leaders invited Edward Teller and other
leading
members
of
the
scientific/technological elite to reconsider the
issue of human spaceflight as a national
security objective. Teller’s group concluded
that the Air Force could place a human in orbit
within two years, and urged the department
pursue this goal. Teller understood, however,
that there was essentially no military reason
for undertaking this mission and chose not to
tie his recommendation to any specific
rationale, instead falling back on a belief that
the first nation to do so would accrue national
prestige and advance, in a general manner,
science and technology. 6
Early in 1958, Lieutenant General Donald L.
Putt, the USAF Deputy Chief of Staff for
Development, informed Director of the
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
(NACA), Hugh L. Dryden, that the Air Force
intended to pursue “a research vehicle
program having as its objective the earliest
possible manned orbital flight, which will

3

William B. Scott, “Two-Stage-to-Orbit ‘Blackstar’ System
Shelved at Groom Lake?” Aviation Week & Space
Technology, 5 March 2006, http://www.aviationweek.com/
aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=awst&id=news/030606
p1.xml (accessed 19 February 2010).4Wernher von Braun,
“Crossing the Last Frontier,” Collier’s, 22 March 1952, pp.
24–29, 72–74; and Michael J. Neufeld, “Space Superiority:
Wernher von Braun’s Campaign for a Nuclear-Armed Space
Station, 1946–1956,” Space Policy 22 (February 2006): 5262.
4
Wernher von Braun, “Crossing the Last Frontier,” Collier’s,
22 March 1952, pp. 24–29, 72–74; and Michael J. Neufeld,
“Space Superiority: Wernher von Braun’s Campaign for a

Nuclear-Armed Space Station, 1946–1956,” Space Policy 22
(February 2006): 52-62.
5
The Man-in-Space-Soonest program called for a four-phase
capsule orbital process, which would first use instruments, to
be followed by primates, then a pilot, with the final objective
of landing humans on the Moon. See David N. Spires, Beyond
Horizons: A Half Century of Air Force Space Leadership (Air
Force Space Command, 1997), p. 75.
6
Loyd S. Swenson, James M. Grimwood, and Charles C.
Alexander, This New Ocean: A History of Project Mercury
(Washington, DC: NASA SP-5201, 1966), pp.73–74.
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contribute substantially and essentially to
follow-on scientific and military space
systems.” Putt asked Dryden to collaborate in
this effort, but with the NACA as a decidedly
junior partner. 7 Even though Dryden agreed,
by the end of the summer of 1958, Putt found
the newly created NASA leading the human
spaceflight effort for the United States, with
the Air Force being the junior partner. 8
Throughout the first part of 1958, Air Force
officials pressed for leadership of MISS. As
the most experienced in developing space
technology, the Air Force expected to lead any
space program for the United States.
Specifically, it believed hypersonic space
planes and lunar bases would serve national
security needs. To help make this a reality, the
Air Force requested $133 million for the MISS
program and secured approval by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. 9 However, a series of
disagreements between Air Force and NACA
officials disturbed the picture. These
difficulties reverberated all the way to the
Office of the President, prompting a review of
the roles of the two organizations. 10 Hugh
7

Lt. Gen. Donald L. Putt, USAF Deputy Chief of Staff,
Development, to Hugh L. Dryden, NACA Director, 31
January 1958, Folder #18674, NASA Historical Reference
Collection, NASA History Division, NASA Headquarters,
Washington, DC.
8
NACA to USAF Deputy Chief of Staff, Development,
“Transmittal of Copies of Proposed Memorandum of
Understanding between Air Force and NACA for joint
NACA-Air Force Project for a Recoverable Manned Satellite
Test Vehicle,” 11 April 1958, Folder #18674, NASA
Historical Reference Collection.
9
The breakdown for this budget was aircraft and missiles—
$32M, support—$11.5M, construction—$2.5M, and R&D—
$87M. See Memorandum for ARPA Director, “Air Force
Man-in-Space Program,” 19 March 1958, Folder #18674,
NASA Historical Reference Collection.
10
Maurice H. Stans, Director, Bureau of the Budget,
Memorandum for the President, “Responsibility for “Space”
Programs,” 10 May 1958; Maxime A. Faget, NACA,
Memorandum for Dr. Dryden, 5 June 1958; Clotaire Wood,
Headquarters, NACA, Memorandum for files, “Tableing [sic]
of Proposed Memorandum of Understanding Between Air
Force and NACA For a Joint Project For a Recoverable
Manned Satellite Test Vehicle,” 20 May 1958, with attached
Memorandum, “Principles for the Conduct by the NACA and
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Dryden complained in July 1958 to the
President’s Science Advisor, James R. Killian,
about the lack of clarity on the part of the Air
Force. He asserted:
The current objective for a manned
satellite program is the determination
of man’s basic capability in a space
environment as a prelude to the
human exploration of space and to
possible military applications of
manned satellites. Although it is clear
that both the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration and the
Department of Defense should
cooperate in the conduct of the
program, I feel that the responsibility
for and the direction of the program
should rest with NASA.

He urged that the president state a clear
division of responsibility between the two
organizations on the human spaceflight
mission. 11
As David N. Spires and Rick W. Sturdevant
have pointed out, the MISS program became
derailed within the DOD because of funding
concerns:
Throughout the spring and summer of
1958 the Air Force’s Air Research
and Development Command had
mounted an aggressive campaign to
have ARPA [Advanced Research
Projects
Agency]
convince
administration officials to approve its
Man-in-Space-Soonest development
plan. But ARPA balked at the high
cost, technical challenges, and
uncertainties surrounding the future

the Air Force of a Joint Project for a Recoverable Manned
Satellite Vehicle,” 29 April 1958; and Donald A. Quarles,
Secretary of Defense, to Maurice H. Stans, Director, Bureau
of the Budget, 1 April 1958, Folder #18674. All in NASA
Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Division,
NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
11
Hugh L. Dryden, Director, NACA, Memorandum for James
R. Killian Jr., Special Assistant to the President for Science
and Technology, “Manned Satellite Program,” 19 July 1958;
Folder #18674, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
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direction of
agency. 12

the

civilian

space

By the summer of 1958, political leaders in
Washington viewed the human spaceflight
mission more useful as an international
prestige program than as a national security
initiative.
By the time that Dwight D. Eisenhower signed
the National Aeronautics and Space Act of
1958 into law, he had decided to split the
human space mission from military
leadership, and he
formally assigned The… objective
the coveted human for a manned
spaceflight mission
satellite program
to
NASA.
Thereafter,
the is the
MISS program was determination of
folded into what man’s basic
became
Project capability in a
Mercury. In early space
November
1958,
environment as
the DOD acceded
to the president’s a prelude to the
desire that the human
human spaceflight exploration of
program
be
a space and to
civilian effort under possible military
the management of
applications of
NASA. For its part,
NASA invited Air manned
Force officials to satellites…
appoint
liaison
personnel to the Mercury program office at
Langley Research Center in Hampton,
Virginia, and they did so. 13
12
David N. Spires and Rick W. Sturdevant, “…to the very
limit of our ability…: Reflections on Forty Years of CivilMilitary Partnership in Space Launch,” in Roger D. Launius
and Dennis R. Jenkins, eds., To Reach the High Frontier: A
History of U.S Launch Vehicles (University Press of
Kentucky, 2002), p. 475.
13
Memorandum for Dr. Silverstein, “Assignment of
Responsibility for ABMA Participation in NASA Manned
Satellite Project,” 12 November 1958; Abe Silverstein to Lt.

The decision to make human spaceflight the
sole responsibility of NASA, a very public
non-military organization, proved prescient. It
might even be considered a brilliant
geopolitical decision, possible because of
civilian leadership of the military, a
foundational pillar of the American military.
Eisenhower helped cement that pillar by this
and other decisions helping to inexorably
weave it into the military culture.
By de-coupling it from the DOD, the president
exponentially reduced the confrontational
aspect of the space race in its most dramatic
element. With NASA officially charged with
the peaceful exploration of space, and with
human spaceflight as a core element of that
mission, a space race could exist without fear
of national survival. Numerous international
agreements stated this fundamental truth from
the decisions of the United Nations (UN) in
the latter 1950s to the Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space in 1967. 14
Regardless of who was to manage the human
spaceflight program, American officials
recognized that time was of the essence in
undertaking the human space missions. The
compelling nature of this aspect of the space
race pushed NASA to pursue the Mercury
orbital program. Roy Johnson, director of
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA)

Gen. Roscoe C. Wilson, USAF Deputy Chief of Staff,
Development, 20 November 1958; and Hugh, L. Dryden,
Deputy Administrator, NASA, Memorandum for Dr. Eugene
Emme for NASA Historical Files, “The “signed” Agreement
of 11 April 1958, on a Recoverable Manned Satellite Test
Vehicle,” 8 September 1965, Folder #18674. All in NASA
Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Division,
NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
14
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI),
adopted on 20 December 1961; Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, Signed at Washington, London, Moscow, 27 January
1967.
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for the DOD, noted in September 1958 that
competition with the Soviet Union precluded
taking a cautious approach to human
spaceflight and advocated additional funding
to ensure its timely completion. As he wrote to
the Secretary of Defense and the NASA
Administrator:
I am troubled, however, with respect
to one of the projects in which there
is general agreement that it should be
a joint undertaking. This is the socalled “Man-in-Space” project for
which $10 million has been allocated
to ARPA and $30 million to NASA.
My concern over this project is due
(1) to a firm conviction, backed by
intelligence briefings, that the Soviets
next spectacular effort in space will
be to orbit a human, and (2) that the
amount of $40 million for FY 1959 is
woefully inadequate to compete with
the Russian program. As you know
our best estimates (based on some 1215 plans) were $100 to $150 million
for an optimum FY 1959 program.
I am convinced that the military and
psychological impact on the United
States and its Allies of a successful
Soviet man-in-space “first” program
would be far reaching and of great
consequence.
Because of this deep conviction, I feel
that no time should be lost in
launching an aggressive Man-inSpace program and that we should be
prepared if the situation warrants, to
request supplemental appropriations
of the Congress in January to pursue
the program with the utmost
urgency. 15

Johnson agreed to transfer a series of space
projects from ARPA to NASA, establishing
protocols for cooperating in the development
15

Roy W. Johnson, Director, ARPA, DOD, Memorandum for
the Administrator, NASA, “Man-in-Space Program,” 3
September 1958, Folder #18674, NASA Historical Reference
Collection, NASA History Division, NASA Headquarters,
Washington, D.C.
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of equipment that would be used in the human
spaceflight program. 16
To aid in the conduct of this program, ARPA
and NASA created a committee, the Joint
Manned Satellite Panel, on 18 September
1958. Holding its first meeting on 24
September, this panel established goals and
strategy. Chaired by NASA’s Robert Gilruth,
but also including such key figures as Max
Faget and George Low, the panel focused on a
wide range of technical requirements. Under
this panel’s auspices final specifications for
the piloted capsule emerged in October 1958,
as did procurement of both a modified
Redstone, for suborbital flights, and Atlas
boosters for orbital missions. 17
Through this process, NASA gained a firm
grasp of what soon became known as the
Mercury program. Between the creation of
NASA in 1958 and 1963, a little less than five
years, this first human space program was
completed at a cost of $384 million. This may
have been the best bargain ever in human
spaceflight, in no small measure because its
goals were uncomplicated. Although lagging
behind the original schedule, NASA’s Mercury
program succeeded in proving the possibility of
safe human spaceflight and in demonstrating
16

Roy W. Johnson, Director, ARPA, DOD, Memorandum for
the Administrator, NASA, “Man-in-Space Program, 19
September 1958, with attached Memorandum of
Understanding, “Principles for the Conduct by NASA and
ARPA of a Joint Program for a Manned Orbital Vehicle,” 19
September 1958, Folder #18674, NASA Historical Reference
Collection, NASA History Division, NASA Headquarters,
Washington, D.C.
17
Minutes of Meetings, Panel for Manned Space Flight, 24, 30
September, 1 October 1958; NASA, “Preliminary
Specifications for Manned Satellite Capsule,” October 1958;
and Paul E. Purser, Aeronautical Research Engineer, NASA,
to Mr. R. R. Gilruth, NASA, “Procurement of Ballistic
Missiles for use as Boosters in NASA Research Leading to
Manned Space Flight,” 8 October 1958, with attached, “Letter
of Intent to AOMC (ABMA), Draft of Technical Content,” 8
October 1958, Folder #18674. All in NASA Historical
Reference Collection, NASA History Division, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
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and to manage operations of this
kind. 18

U.S. technological competence during its Cold
War rivalry with the Soviet Union.
At the conclusion of the Mercury effort, Walter
C. Williams noted that “in the period of about
45 months of activity, some 25 flights were
made...” He then commented on what the
United States learned in completing Mercury:
I think we learned… about spacecraft
technology and how a spacecraft
should be built, what its systems
should be, how they should perform,
where the critical redundancies are
required. I think we learned
something about man-rating boosters,
how to take a weapons system
development and turn it into a
manned transportation system. I
think… we found primarily… that
this was a matter of providing a
malfunction detection system or an
abort system, and, also, we found
very careful attention to detail as far
as quality control was concerned. I
think that some of the less obvious
things we learned – we learned how
to plan these missions and this takes a
lot of detail work, because it’s not
only planning how it goes, but how it
doesn’t go, and the abort cases and
the emergency cases always took a lot
more effort than the planned
missions... We learned what is
important in training crews for
missions of this type. When the crewtraining program was laid down, the
program had to cover the entire
gamut because we weren’t quite sure
exactly what these people needed to
carry out the missions. I think we
have a much better focus on this now.
We learned how to control these
flights in real time. This was a new
concept on a worldwide basis. I think
we learned, and when I say we, I’m
talking of this as a National asset, not
NASA alone, we learned how to
operate the world network in real
time and keep it up. And I think we
learned a lot in how to manage
development programs of this kind

Christopher C. Kraft, senior flight controller,
agreed: Mercury “changed quite a few
concepts about space, added greatly to our
knowledge of the universe around us, and
demonstrated that Man has a proper role in
exploring it. There are many unknowns that
lie ahead, but we are reassured because we are
confident in overcoming them by using Man’s
capabilities to the fullest.” 19
The Military’s Continued Interest
in Human Spaceflight
The DOD, while certainly an important
supporting organization in Mercury, remained
committed to achieving an independent human
spaceflight capability. “If we concede that
man can go into space for peaceful missions,”
stated a USAF white paper in 1961, “we must
admit that man can go into this same
environment for military purposes. It is the
Air Force view that many will be required to
go into space to perform tasks that will be
important to our national security.” 20 From
this position flowed a series of decisions
aimed at creating what the DOD called the
Manned Military Space Program (MMSP).
Several immediate programs resulted and the
Air Force noted: “Fully coordinated,
cooperative and where appropriate, joint effort
between the Air Force and the NASA is
required in order that the content and
objectives of the MMSP are properly defined
18

Walter C. Williams, Deputy Director, NASA Manned
Spacecraft Center, “Project Review,” 3 October 1963, NASA
Historical Reference Collection.
19
Christopher C. Kraft, “A Review of Knowledge Acquired
from the First Manned Satellite Program,” NASA Historical
Reference Collection, NASA History Division, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
20
United States Air Force, “White Paper on the Air Force
Manned Military Space Program,” Military Records Center,
National Archives and Records Administration.

Space and Defense, Summer 2010

within the framework of the total national
space program.” 21
Accordingly, several programs were aimed
towards realizing a human military space
program. The first was a cooperative program
with NASA to fly the X-15 research aircraft.
Several flights reached above 50 nautical
miles in altitude (about 93 kilometers), the
USAF recognized point at which space began.
The highest military flight was by pilot Robert
White at 314,750 feet (59 miles or 96
kilometers). The Air Force awarded four of its
pilots in the program—William Knight,
Michael Adams, Joe Engle, and Robert
Rushworth—astronaut wings. This upset
NASA officials, and for 40 years, NASA did
not recognize any of its X-15 pilots as
astronauts, although NASA pilot Joe Walker
had exceeded 62 miles (the official definition
of where space begins at 100 kilometers). In
2005, NASA recognized all the NASA pilots
– Walker, John McKay, Bill Dana – who had
exceeded the 50 mile altitude as astronauts,
and the USAF had always recognized theirs. 22
In addition, USAF pursued the X-20 DynaSoar, a military space plane to be launched
atop a newly developed space launch vehicle.
The Air Force believed that the X-20 would
provide long range bombardment and
reconnaissance capability by flying at the edge
of space and skipping off the Earth’s
atmosphere to reach targets anywhere in the
world. Begun on 15 October 1957, although
the program may be traced directly to the
Bomi (skip-glide space bomber project) and
Robo glider (manned hypersonic bomber)
programs of the early 1950s; the Air Force
intended to use the Titan IIIC to launch its

21

Ibid.
Dennis R. Jenkins, Hypersonics Before the Shuttle: A
Concise History of the X-15 Research Airplane (Monographs
in Aerospace History, NASA SP-2000-4518, 2000), pp. 61,
67, 117.
22
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space plane. 23 This winged, recoverable
spacecraft did not possess as large a payload
as NASA’s capsule-type spacecraft and was
always troubled by the absence of a clearly
defined military mission. Several problems
were apparent. First, the difficulty of defining
the military mission separate from that of
NASA proved a challenge. At some level,
there were many possibilities and it was
difficult to separate them from those of
NASA. Second, the technical capabilities of
Dyna-soar made determining on a specific
mission out of the many envisioned very
difficult.
Accordingly, in September 1961 Defense
Secretary Robert S. McNamara questioned
whether Dyna-Soar represented the best
expenditure of funds. This resulted in
numerous studies
United States of the program, but
leaders in 1963 McNamara
the
supported the cancelled
program in favor
Space Shuttle of a separate
not on its merits, human spaceflight
but on the image program,
the
Manned
Orbiting
it projected.
Laboratory (MOL).
This military space station, known as GeminiB, would be launched into orbit aboard a Titan
IIIM vehicle that used seven-segment solids
and was human-rated that went by the name of
Blue Gemini. As an example of the
seriousness with which the Air Force pursued
the MOL program, the third Titan IIIC test
flight boosted a prototype aerodynamic
mockup of the MOL laboratory into orbit. It
was as close as MOL would come to reality.
The new military space station plan ran into
numerous technical and fiscal problems, and
23

As the weight and complexity of Dyna-Soar grew, it quickly
surpassed the capabilities of the Titan II and was switched to
the Titan III. Just before the program was canceled it looked
like weight growth had outclassed even the Titan IIIC and
plans were being made to use Saturn IBs or other boosters.
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in June 1969 the Secretary of Defense, Melvin
R. Laird, informed Congress that MOL would
be canceled. 24

Even so, the next major effort involved
persuading NASA to alter its Space Shuttle
concept and to include a military mission in its
planning scenarios in the 1970s. 26

Military space policy analyst Paul Stares
summarized the fallout from the loss of the X20 and MOL programs upon the Air Force
during the 1960s:
With the cancellation of the Dynasoar and MOL, many believed in the
Air Force that they had made their
“pitch” and failed. This in turn
reduced the incentives to try again
and reinforced the bias towards the
traditional mission of the Air Force,
namely flying. As a result, the Air
Force’s space activities remained a
poor relation to tactical and strategic
airpower in its organizational
hierarchy and inevitably in its
funding priorities. This undoubtedly
influenced the Air Force’s negative
attitude towards the various ASAT
modernization proposals put forward
by Air Defense Command and others
in the early 1970s. The provision of
satellite survivability measures also
suffered because the Air Force was
reluctant to propose initiatives that
would require the use of its own
budget to defend the space assets of
other services and agencies. 25
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1994): 5-11; Terry Smith, “The Dyna-Soar X-20: A Historical
Overview,” Quest: The Magazine of Spaceflight 3 (Winter
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Spaceflight 4 (Fall 1995): 4-17; Donald Pealer, “Manned
Orbiting Laboratory (MOL), Part 2,” Quest: The Magazine of
Spaceflight 4 (Winter 1995): 28-37; and Donald Pealer,
“Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL), Part 3,” Quest: The
Magazine of Spaceflight 5, No. 2 (1996): 16-23.
25
Paul B. Stares, The Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy, 19451984 (Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 242.

The Department of Defense
and NASA’s Space Shuttle
After Apollo, the human element of the
United States civil space program went into a
holding pattern as nearly a decade passed.
During that time, the space program moved
from its earlier heroic age to one that may be
characterized as a “routinization” of activities,
perspectives, and processes; it was an
institutionalizing of critical elements from a
remarkably fertile heroic time into something
much more mundane not at all unlike that
analyzed by longshoreman philosopher Eric
Hoffer in The True Believer. 27
During the 1970s, the Space Shuttle became
the “sine qua non” of NASA, intended as it
was to make spaceflight routine, safe, and
relatively inexpensive. Although NASA
considered a variety of configurations, some
quite exotic, it settled on a stage-and-one-half
partially reusable vehicle with an approved
development price of $5.15 billion. On 5
January 1972, President Nixon announced the
decision to build a Space Shuttle. He did so
for both political reasons and for national
prestige purposes. Politically, it would help a
lagging aerospace industry in key states he
wanted to carry in the next election, especially
26
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in California, Texas, and Florida. 28 Supporters
– especially Caspar W. Weinberger, who later
became Reagan’s defense secretary – argued
that building the shuttle would reaffirm
America’s superpower status and help restore
confidence, at home and abroad, in America’s
technological genius and will to succeed.
This was purely an issue of national prestige.
As Weinberger wrote in August 1971, not
approving the shuttle “would be confirming in
some respects, a belief that I fear is gaining
credence at home and abroad: that our best
years are behind us, that we are turning
inward, reducing our defense commitments,
and voluntarily starting to give up our
superpower status, and our desire to maintain
world superiority.” Weinberger appealed
directly to the prestige argument by
concluding, “America should be able to afford
something
besides
increased
welfare,
programs to repair our cities, or Appalachian
relief and the like.” In a handwritten scrawl on
Weinberger’s memo, Richard Nixon indicated
“I agree with Cap.” 29
The prestige factor belies a critical
component. United States leaders supported
the Space Shuttle not on its merits, but on the
image it projected. That included NASA,
28
George M. Low, NASA Deputy Administrator,
Memorandum for the Record, “Meeting with the President on
January 5, 1972,” 12 January 1972, NASA Historical
Reference Collection, NASA History Division, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C. The John Erlichman
interview by John M. Logsdon, 6 May 1983, NASA
Historical Reference Collection, emphasizes the political
nature of the decision. This aspect of the issue was also
brought home to Nixon by other factors such as letters and
personal meetings. See Frank Kizis to Richard M. Nixon, 12
March 1971; Noble M. Melencamp, White House, to Frank
Kizis, 19 April 1971, both in Record Group 51, Series 69.1,
Box
51-78-31,
National
Archives
and
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Administration, Washington, DC.
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whose leaders viewed it central to the
agency’s long-term welfare, but also some key
figures in the DOD who recognized the Space
Shuttle as a means of finally reaching the goal
of military personnel going into space for
military purposes. That military mission, as it
came to coalesce around the new Space
Shuttle in the 1970s, took as its raison d’être
the deployment of reconnaissance and other
national security payloads into low-Earth orbit
(LEO). As such, the DOD and the intelligence
community insisted that the shuttle’s orbiter
be designed so that it had a cross-range
maneuvering capability to meet requirements
for lift-off and landing at the same location
after only one orbit. This would enable great
flexibility in deploying those space assets into
orbit, while masking their trajectories from the
Soviet Union. Moreover, the payload bay of
the Space Shuttle, so often viewed as
excessive for most mission requirements,
needed its 15 (4.6 meters) x 60 (18.3 meters)
feet dimensions to satisfy DOD and
intelligence community planners that it would
accommodate national security payloads.
Without those design modifications to support
the military space program, the DOD would
have probably withheld monetary and political
support from the project. In essence, NASA
embraced a military mission for the Space
Shuttle program as a means of building a
coalition in support of an approval that might
not have been approved otherwise. In return,
military astronauts would fly on classified
missions in LEO. Most of those missions were
for the purpose of deploying reconnaissance
satellites but what else might have been
accomplished on them is unknown in the nonclassified world. 30
30

Dwayne A. Day, “Invitation to Struggle: The History of
Civilian-Military Relations in Space,” in John M. Logsdon,
gen. ed., Exploring the Uniontown: Selected Documents in the
History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume II, External
Relationships (NASA SP-4407, 1996), p. 264; Alfred C.
Draper, Melvin L. Buck, and William H. Goesch, “A Delta
Shuttle Orbiter,” Astronautics & Aeronautics 9 (January 1971):
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It might be easy to underestimate the national
security implications of the Space Shuttle
decision and the desire of some in the DOD to
gain a military astronaut foothold that
facilitated it. But, this goal seems to be critical
to DOD support.
Caspar Weinberger …key figures in
was the key to the the DOD…
movement of the recognized the
Space
Shuttle
Space Shuttle
through the White
House,
and
he as a means of
believed the shuttle finally reaching
had obvious military the goal of
uses and profound military
implications
for personnel
national security. “I
going into
thought we could get
substantial return” space for
with the program, he military
said in a 1977 purposes.
interview,
“both
from the point of view of national defense,
and from the point of view [of] scientific
advancement which would have a direct
beneficial effect.” 31 He and others also
impressed on the president the shuttle’s
potential for military missions. John
Erlichman, Nixon’s senior advisor for
domestic affairs, even thought it might be
useful to capture enemy satellites, a mission
that would require military astronauts in effect
“lassoing” those satellites during extravehicular activities (EVAs) and bringing them
into the shuttle payload bay for return to

26-35; Charles W. Mathews, “The Space Shuttle and its Uses,”
Aeronautical Journal 76 (January 1972): 19-25; John M.
Logsdon, “The Space Shuttle Program: A Policy Failure,”
Science 232 (30 May 1986): 1099-1105; Scott Pace,
“Engineering Design and Political Choice: The Space Shuttle,
1969-1972,” M.S. Thesis, MIT, May 1982; and Harry A. Scott,
“Space Shuttle: A Case Study in Design,” Astronautics &
Aeronautics 17 (June 1979): 54-58;
31
Caspar W. Weinberger interview by John M. Logsdon, 23
August 1977, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA
History Division, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

Earth. 32 The Soviet Union, which built the
Buran in the 1980s and flew it without a crew
only one time, pursued a shuttle project as a
counterbalance to the United States program
solely because they were convinced that the
United States shuttle was developed for
military purposes. As Russian space watcher
James Oberg concluded: “They had actually
studied the shuttle plans and figured it was
designed for an out-of-plane bombing run
over high-value Soviet targets. Brezhnev
believed that and in 1976 ordered $10 billion
of expenditures. They had the Buran flying
within ten years and discovered they couldn’t
do anything with it.” 33
After a decade of development, on 12 April
1981, the Space Shuttle Columbia took-off for
the first orbital test mission. It was successful
and after only the fourth flight in 1982,
President Ronald Reagan declared the system
“operational.” In keeping with plans
developed in the Carter administration of the
latter 1970s, the Space Shuttle would
thereafter carry all U.S. government payloads;
military, scientific, and even commercial
satellites could all be deployed from its
payload bay. 34 To prepare for this, in 1979,
Air Force Secretary Hans Mark created the
Manned Spaceflight Engineer program to
“Develop expertise in manned space flight and
apply it to Department of Defense space
32
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missions.” In all, between 1979 and 1986 this
organization trained 32 Navy and Air Force
officers as military astronauts. 35
Even so, the shuttle soon proved
disappointing. By January 1986 there had
been only 24 shuttle flights, although in the
1970s NASA had projected more flights than
that for every year. Critical analyses agreed
that the shuttle had proven to be neither cheap
nor reliable, both primary selling points, and
that NASA should never have used those
arguments in building a political consensus for
the program. The space shuttle’s much-touted
capabilities had not been realized. It made far
fewer flights and conducted far fewer
scientific experiments than NASA had
publicly predicted. 36 Its national security
possibilities, however, remained intact. The
DOD flew missions as needed to deploy its
assets and conduct other activities in Earth
orbit with military astronauts.
Through the middle part of the 1980s, the
DOD remained committed to supporting it for
military purposes. The Air Force paid for the
construction of the Discovery orbiter, and
began building Space Launch Complex (SLC)
6 at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, in
1979 (having been approved in 1974) for the
launch of polar orbital flights. Furthermore, it
negotiated with NASA an annual launch rate
of 40 missions from the Kennedy Space
Center with 20 from Vandenberg. This proved
a ridiculous number of launches, but it pointed
up the optimism of human spaceflight
program as envisioned at the dawn of the
Space Shuttle program. 37
35
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Any plans the DOD might have harbored for
human spaceflight were dashed with the loss
of Challenger during launch on 28 January
1986. 38 One of the results of this was the
removal from the shuttle of all commercial
and national security payloads and the
reinvigoration of the expendable launch
vehicle production lines. It became another
instance of the DOD seeking a military human
mission that eventually went awry.
This quest for military astronauts did not end
there. In 1986, the DOD established a formal
Military Man in Space (MMIS) Program to
oversee efforts to ensure that a human military
presence remained in space. They then
undertook several experiments aimed at
demonstrating the utility of humans in orbit in
observation. As only two examples of military
astronaut activity, Terra View took place on a
shuttle flight where military astronauts
observed the ground and reported observations
of military interest. Additionally, in Terra
Scout, Astronaut LTC Jim Voss and Payload
Specialist CW3 Tom Hennen, aboard STS-44
in November 1991, used the Spaceborne
Direct View Optical System (SPADVOS) to
view terrestrial targets.39 Since the beginning
of the Space Shuttle flight program, the DOD
has flown a myriad of payloads on the vehicle.
Also, in the 1980s, DOD began work, along
with NASA, on a single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO)
vehicle for military purposes. If there is a
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“holy grail” of spaceflight it is the desire for
reusable SSTO technology, essentially a
vehicle that can take-off, fly into orbit,
perform its mission, and return to Earth
landing like an airplane. This is an
exceptionally difficult flight regime with a
myriad of challenges relating to propulsion,
materials, aerodynamics, guidance, and
control. Fueled by the realization the Space
Shuttle could not deliver on its early
expectations, DOD leaders pressed for the
development of a hypersonic space plane.
With the beginning of the administration of
Ronald Reagan, and its associated military
buildup, Tony DuPont, head of DuPont
Aerospace, offered an unsolicited proposal to
the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) to design a hypersonic
vehicle powered by a hybrid integrated engine
of scramjets and rockets. DARPA program
manager Bob Williams liked the idea, and
funded it as a “black” program code-named
“Copper Canyon” between 1983 and 1985.
The Reagan administration later unveiled it as
the National Aerospace Plane (NASP),
designated the X-30. Reagan called it “a new
Orient Express that could, by the end of the
next decade, take-off from Dulles Airport and
accelerate up to twenty-five times the speed of
sound, attaining low earth orbit or flying to
Tokyo within two hours.” 40
The NASP program initially proposed to build
two research craft, at least one of which
should achieve orbit by flying in a single stage
through the atmosphere at speeds up to Mach
25. The X-30 would use a multicycle engine
that shifted from jet to ramjet and to scramjet
speeds as the vehicle ascended burning liquid
hydrogen fuel with oxygen scooped and

40
Ronald Reagan, “State of the Union Address,” 4 February
1986, see http://www.c-span.org/executive/transcript.asp?cat=
current_event&code=bush_admin&year=1986 (accessed 29
December 2009).

frozen from the atmosphere. 41 After billions
spent, NASP never progressed to flight stage.
It finally ended in 1994, trapped as it was in
bureaucratic politics and seemingly endless
technological difficulties.42
Yet, elements of the DOD remain committed
to this mission to the present. Throughout the
1990s, a succession of studies argued for the
potential of military personnel in space. One
1992 study affirmed:
It is absolutely essential for the well
being of today’s space forces as well
as the future space forces of 2025,
that DOD develop manned advanced
technology space systems in lieu of or
in addition to unmanned systems to
effectively utilize military man’s
compelling
and
aggressive
warfighting abilities to accomplish
the critical wartime mission elements
of space control and force
application. National space policy,
military space doctrine and common
sense all dictate they should do so if
space superiority during future,
inevitable conflict with enemy space
forces is the paramount objective.
Deploying military man in space will
provide that space superiority and he
will finally become the “center of
gravity” of the U.S. space program. 43

Another analysis found 37 reasons why
military personnel in space would be required
41
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in the future, ranging from problem-solving
and decision-making, to manipulation of
sensors and other systems. It concluded that
“A military space plane could play a key role
in helping the United States Air Force
transform itself from an air force into an
aerospace force.” 44 Yet another study found:
“Our National Security Strategy must take full
advantage of the full political, economic, and
military power of this nation to be successful.
That means soldiers,
sailors, and airmen A military space
able to operate in plane could play
every region of the
world critical to a key role in
national
security, helping the
whether it is on United States
land, at sea, in the Air Force
air, or in space. A transform itself
strategy built on from an air force
anything less is
incomplete
and into an
shortsighted.” 45 The aerospace
rationale
for
a force.
military astronaut
rests largely on the human flexibility of
offering judgment, experience, and decisionmaking capabilities not present with
machines. “There is no way that a price tag
can be placed on such characteristics as
flexibility or serendipity because the essence
of these attributes is the ability to capitalize on
the unanticipated or unknown,” concluded one
study. 46 According to some reports, DOD
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developed a space plane named “Blackstar”
and began flying missions as early as 1990. 47
Notwithstanding these speculations, it is
obvious the decision made initially by
Eisenhower to split the civil and military
space programs and to assign the human
mission to the civil side remains difficult for
some in the DOD to accept. It represents one
instance, among many, in which a continuum
between cooperation and competition has
taken place in the interrelationships between
the civil, military, and national reconnaissance
space programs.
Is There a Military Human Spaceflight
Mission on the Horizon?
There has been both cooperation and
competition between the civil and military
space programs over the years relative to the
role of humans in space. In a succession of
recent studies ranging from the Air Force
Science Board’s “New World Vista” in 1995
to the Rumsfeld commission’s 2001 analysis
of national security space issues, the DOD
persistently sought to find a role for humans in
space. 48 While this has waned somewhat, there
remains sporadic expressions of interest from
military officials in favor of the development
of systems for military human missions in
space. 49 Indeed, as robotic technologies have
improved, the trend has been away from
placing humans in harm’s way in favor of
other options. The rise of unmanned aerial
47
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vehicles (UAV) piloted from the remote sites
in the 1990s was driven by the desire to limit
crew exposure to harm, while increasing loiter
time over target areas. The success of UAVs
in carrying out missions that had formerly
required flight crews has emboldened DOD
executives to advance this type of technology
for all future weapons systems. 50 In such an
environment, whatever desires that still exist
in favor of piloted military space vehicles
have less possibility of achieving this goal
than even a few years earlier. At a sublime
level, human military pilots appear to be a
twentieth century and
not a twenty-first …the military
may create a
century priority.

Space Corps of
This is especially the Engineers. Its
case
because forces may
rationales supporting
expand to
human
spaceflight
are overall quite every location
controversial even as where
they are sometimes humanity
passionately held – establishes a
mostly resting on presence... It
arguments of national
may serve as
prestige, rather than
practical applications the
– and there does not peacekeepers
seem to be much and the law
possibility of this enforcers.
changing in the nearterm. 51 Of course, one could make the
observation that since the end of the Cold War
many of the historic policy options, of which
the assignment of the United States human
50
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spaceflight mission to NASA is one, needs to
be revisited. Reassigning that mission, or a
portion of it, to the DOD might become a
possibility should the space agency suffer
another disaster on the order of the Challenger
and Columbia shuttle accidents, or if enemies
pursued a human presence in space, although
this is unlikely in terms of policy options.
More likely, is a scenario in which military
astronauts will enter space in a manner similar
to what soldiers excelled at throughout the
first century-and-a-half of the United States
republic: exploring, extending, and protecting
the frontier. The United States Army explored
the American West, kept order on the frontier,
and opened the region to colonization. The
frontier army pushed the line of occupation far
beyond the settlements that would have
resulted otherwise. It raised crops, herded
cattle, cut timber, quarried stone, built
sawmills, and performed the manifold duties
of pioneers in addition to its peacekeeping
mission. It also restrained lawless traders,
pursued
fugitives,
ejected
squatters,
maintained order, and served as the primary
interface with the Native Americans. In this
latter role, it was more benevolent than
remembered in popular conception. This was
largely peaceful work, with the military
catalyzing the processes of territorial
expansion and national development. The
military outposts on the frontier also served as
cash markets for early settlers and as centers
of exploration, community building, and
cultural development. In the past, the military
accomplished these tasks in the American
West; in the future, it might well do so in
space. 52 This is a far different approach to
“military men in space” than has been argued
for thus far, but once there is a true space
frontier the military will be required to be
52
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there just as in the past. How far into the
future this might take place is an open
question, but it will undoubtedly happen if the
United States continues to pursue human
space exploration and development.
This would amount to a significant a role for
the United States military in space as any
other that might be envisioned. In the
nineteenth century, it conducted exploration,
as with the Lewis and Clark Expedition, and
its civil engineering efforts, led by the United
States Corps of Topographical Engineers and
the United States Army Corps of Engineers,
proved remarkably significant in opening the
West. 53 In the twenty-first century, the military
may create a Space Corps of Engineers. Its
forces may expand to every location where
humanity establishes a presence, especially on
the Moon. It may serve as the peacekeepers
and the law enforcers. It may preserve
American interests against any who might
seek to subvert them. Withal, the military
presence may well help to open a frontier
beyond Earth in the same way that it did on
the North American continent earlier. But
before those possibilities emerge, there
remains only a modest likelihood of the need
for military personnel in space.
Conclusions
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dominate or are there heightened prospects for
commercial activities first in LEO and
ultimately beyond? If it is the latter, then the
prospects for military human space missions
expand exponentially as a means of keeping
order in this new regime.
This may become the new future for space
exploration if Congress accepts the Obama
Administration’s approach. If it does, the false
starts of the past could be replaced by what is
envisioned as “A new era of Innovation and
Discovery.” This new direction and change is
more than just semantics. It proposes a major
shift in the way in which the United States
government approaches human spaceflight.
Simply put, it represents a paradigm shift in
space exploration. In this new approach,
NASA will return to its roots as a research and
development organization to develop the
transformational technologies, while private
industry will operate the systems built.
Turning LEO over to commercial entities, as
in the classic 1968 feature film 2001: A Space
Odyssey, could allow the withdrawal of
government operators out of this arena,
allowing them to concentrate on regulatory,
military, and oversight roles. In this
environment, there is an important place for
the peacekeeping function of a frontier, a
natural mission for the DOD requiring a
human spaceflight capability. 54

At the time when the United States is
reconsidering its next steps in the human
exploration and development of space, it bears
considering this possibility for the future of
military astronauts. What will take place in the
near-term is very much a matter of yet to be
resolved. Federal entities will certainly play a
key role. Will they, however, continue to
53
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Explorer and the Scientist in the Winning of the American
West (Random House, 1966).
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I made this case in Roger D. Launius and G. Michael Green,
“New Vision for NASA,” Florida Today, 14 February 2010.
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Space Situational Awareness
Workshop
The goal of the Space Situational Awareness
(SSA) Workshop is to bring together
stakeholders interested in space situational
awareness. This includes practitioners, users
of data, representatives of industry and the
military,
the
scientific
community,
international organizations, and the satellitetracking community. These stakeholders
discuss how needs are changing with SSA,
what improvements in SSA capabilities can be
achieved in the near-term to medium-term,
and how various stakeholder communities
might better interact to draw on each other’s
strengths.
The first workshop was held in 2006. It was
co-sponsored by the World Security Institute’s
Center for Defense Information. A workshop
report can be found at: http://www.cdi.org/
PDFs/SSAConference_screen.pdf.
The second workshop was hosted by Inmarsat
in 2007 and was co-sponsored by the World
Security Institute’s Center for Defense
Information
and
the
Secure
World
Foundation. A summary of the discussions
that took place at the workshop held in 2007
was published in Space and Defense 2:1
(2008) – “Improving Our Vision II: Building
Transparency and Cooperation Workshop on
Space Situational Awareness Data Sharing.” 1
The third workshop was held in 2009. This
workshop was hosted by Intelsat and was co1

For copies of Space and Defense, see http://web.mac.com/
rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_
Studies/Journal.html (accessed May 2010).

sponsored by the World Security Institute’s
Center for Defense Information, the Secure
World Foundation, and the George C.
Marshall Institute. A summary of the 2009
workshop was published in Space and
Defense 3:2 (2009) – “Space Situational
Awareness Workshop.”
Areas of focus at the 2009 workshop included:
• National and international perspectives on
SSA.
• Challenges of the space environment.
• Governance issues related to safe and
responsible behavior in the space
environment.
• State of SSA data sharing and the United
States Commercial and Foreign Entities
(CFE) Program.
• Concepts and capabilities for improved
SSA data sharing.
• New opportunities in SSA.
Summer Space Seminar
The Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense
Studies organizes the Summer Space Seminar
to advance two principal goals: (1) to foster an
education and interest in the interdisciplinary
areas of space with the intent to develop space
professionals; and (2) to develop a network of
relations across civil, commercial, and
military space professionals that will likely
emerge from the participants. The first
Summer Space Seminar was held in 2007.
This seminar exposes participants to the
breadth and depth of space activities in the
civil, commercial, and military areas. The
relationships among these areas are explored
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across a number of perspectives – participants
are exposed to the technology and science of
space activities, followed by discussions on
the political, legal, economic, and social
aspects that influence the development and
application of the various civil, commercial,
and military space activities. The emphasis is
on exchanges among the participants.
The Summer Space Seminar is directed
toward bringing together a broad group of
future space professionals to lay a foundation
for a future space policy community in the
military, civilian government, and private
sectors. Participants in the program include
students from the United States Air Force
Academy, U.S. Naval Academy, U.S. Military
Academy, George Washington University,
and
the
Massachusetts
Institute
of
Technology.
The seminar serves as a useful forum for
further professional development given that
several of the participants worked, or are
currently employed, as space professionals.
During the seminar, a great deal of learning
and socialization takes place among the
participants to meet the goal to inform and to
build connections between future space
professionals.

Asia, Space, and Strategy Workshop
In 2006, the Eisenhower Center for Space and
Defense Studies held its first Asia, Space, and
Strategy Workshop. This effort brought
together U.S., Canadian, and European experts
and policy makers from the military, civilian
government, universities, think-tanks, and
private sectors to discuss the implications of
current and future Chinese space policy and to
investigate areas of possible Sino-U.S.
cooperation in space. Beginning in 2007, an
invitation was extended to include Chinese
academics in the discussions. Chinese

participation has increased each year since
then, with four attendees from China at the
2009 workshop in Vancouver, Canada.
The fourth workshop of 2009 was broadened
to include other space powers in the AsiaPacific region. For the first time in the
workshop series, representatives from
Australia and Japan took part. The workshop
focused on common interests that spacefaring
countries of the Pacific Basin have in the
creation of a stable, predictable, and mutually
beneficial environment in space.
Workshop topics in 2009 ranged from:
economic and political goals for the use of
space; improving the safety and stability of the
space environment; deterrence and defense
concepts; and arms control and verification.
Implications of the 2009 workshop were
published in a series of articles in a special
issue of Space and Defense 2:3 (2009) on
China, Space, and Strategy.
National Space Forum
The Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense
Studies organized and held its fourth annual
National Space Forum from 1-2 September
2009 in Washington, DC. Panels at the Forum
discussed security issues and space.
Specific topics of discussion included:
• An assessment of security challenges and
threats in the space domain.
• The role of space deterrence in national
policy.
• The potential for new approaches to arms
control and verification.
• The improvement of international
cooperation with allies in Asia and
Europe.
• The role that China plays in space.
• The implementation of national space
policy in the Obama Administration.
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The Forum concluded with discussions on
how to integrate often competing interests into
a more cohesive policy and, more importantly,
to improve the chances that such a policy can
be effectively implemented. Forum panels
represented a number of points of view from
security, civil, and commercial space.
Proceedings of the National Space Forum
2009 were published in Space and Defense 3:
2.
Transatlantic Space Cooperation
Workshop
In 2008, the Eisenhower Center for Space and
Defense Studies established the Transatlantic
Space Cooperation Workshop. This workshop
series brings together a community of scholars
and experts from the United States and
Europe, including the European Union (EU),
European Space Agency (ESA), and NATO,
to share lessons learned, debate, and network
on joint priorities in civil, security, and
commercial space.
The first workshop was held in Brussels,
Belgium in June 2008. Participants in this
workshop examined U.S., European, and EU
security space priorities and considered
NATO’s space role. Discussions began with
an opening panel where senior U.S., EU, and
NATO officials briefed participants on current
security space priorities before participants
explored issues more in-depth. The goal of the
workshop was to educate senior leadership
from the United States, EU, and NATO on
philosophies and strategies for collective
space security and deterrence in the 21st
Century. The workshop was successful in
initiating
dialogue
on
harmonizing
transatlantic security space strategies.
The second workshop was held in Berlin,
Germany during September 2009. The 2009
workshop fostered dialogue regarding the
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potential for greater cooperation across the
Atlantic to make the most efficient use of
capabilities where possible across civil,
security, and commercial space. A summary
of the 2009 workshop was published in Space
and Defense 3:2 (Winter 2009).
Issues discussed at the 2009 workshop
included:
• Developments over the past year in
transatlantic space cooperation.
• Joint priorities in protection of critical
space infrastructure.
• Transatlantic cooperation on Earth
observations for security and stability.
• Future avenues for advancing transatlantic
cooperation.
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